RAJ KUMAR SHUKLA Vs. STATE OF U P

JUDGEMENT

(1.) -The petitioner Raj Kumar Shukla was appointed as a Lecturer in a minority institution and his services were terminated by an order dated 4.7.1988. The petitioner filed Writ Petition No. 13428 of 1988 which was allowed by a judgment dated 16.3.1999 and the order of termination was set aside. The Committee of Management filed a Special Appeal No. 298 of 1999 which was allowed by a judgment dated 15.9.1999 holding that previous approval of an order of termination passed by the Committee of Management of a minority institution was not required from the District Inspector of Schools. The Division Bench in its judgment, consequently, approved the order of termination. The petitioner filed a Special Leave Petition before the Supreme Court which was dismissed by a judgment dated 10.8.2001. The order of the Supreme Court is quoted herein below :

(2.) THE Supreme Court in its order while dismissing the special leave petition observed that the order of the High Court as well as of the Supreme Court would not come in the way of the petitioner in pursuing any other remedy that is "permissible" under the law (emphasis is mine). Based on the aforesaid observation, it transpires that the petitioner filed an appeal before the Deputy Director of Education under Section 16G (3) (c) of the Intermediate Education Act, 1921. THE said appeal was entertained and notices were issued to the Committee of Management asking them to file a reply. THE Committee of Management filed Writ Petition No. 43611 of 2001 praying for the quashing of the appeal filed before the Deputy Director of Education. THE writ petition was entertained and an interim order was passed staying further proceedings in the appeal.

(3.) A strong reliance has been made by the petitioner with regard to the observation made by the Supreme Court in its order dated 10.8.2001. The petitioner submitted that he had filed the writ petition before the High Court challenging the order of termination on the sole ground that no previous permission under Section 16G (3) (a) of the Intermediate Education Act, 1921 was taken by the Committee of Management from the District Inspector of Schools and therefore, the order of termination was ex facie illegal and without jurisdiction. The learned counsel submitted that the High Court held that previous approval was not required to be obtained by a minority institution from the District Inspector of Schools and to that aspect the matter was affirmed by the Supreme Court. However, since the order of termination was not challenged on merits, the Supreme Court left the matter open to the petitioner to pursue such remedy as permissible under the law. Consequently, the petitioner filed the statutory appeal under Section 16G (3) (c) before the Deputy Director of Education. The petitioner, therefore, submitted that the appeal filed by the petitioner was maintainable and that the petitioner had a right to challenge the order of termination on merit.