ANWAR AHMAD Vs. UNION OF INDIA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) SANJAY Misra, J. The petitioner who was working as Assistant Station Master, Bundki railway station was served with a charge-sheet dated 16-2-1999 on two charges regarding interpolating the date in the fitness memo by changing the same and for shortage of Rs. 1,836/-in the sale of railway tickets during July, 1998 and August, 1998. By an order dated 2-6-1999 an Inquiry Officer was appointed who found that the charges against the petitioner were established. A notice dated 20-12-1999 was given to the petitioner who replied to the same on 14-3-2000. The disciplinary authority upon considering the same imposed the punishment of removal from service by the order dated 10-4-2000. The appeal of the petitioner was rejected on 30-5-2000. In revision the revisional authority reduced the punishment of removal from service to compulsory retirement. The O. A. No. 397 of 2001, Anwar Ahmad v. Union of India & Ors. , was dismissed on 2-5-2002. This writ petition has been filed for quashing of the aforesaid orders. Counter- affidavit and rejoinder affidavit have been exchanged and learned Counsel for the parties have been heard.

(2.) THE first argument raised by the learned Counsel for the petitioner is that the petitioner was denied full and proper opportunity to defend himself during the enquiry. It is contended that one Sri. R. K. Sharma, ASM was not examined during the enquiry he being a vital witness to whom leave application and sick fit certificate was handed over. THE petitioner has, therefore, been deprived of an opportunity to defend himself. It is also contended that in the normal course shortage of cash in sale of railway tickets occurs and the same is made good by the concerned official. THE Enquiry Officer it is contended has not considered these aspects of the matter and, therefore, the enquiry report dated 18-12-1999 is vitiated in the eye of law. It has also been contended that the appellate order and the revisional order are non-speaking orders and therefore, suffer from the vice of non-application of mind and the punishment awarded to the petitioner is disproportionate to the charge found proved against him. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has further contended that learned Tribunal has failed to consider this aspect of the matter and as such the impugned orders are liable to be set aside.

(3.) IN the case of B. C. Chaturvedi v. Union of INdia & Ors. , 1996 (1) LBESR 424 (SC) : 1996 SCC (L&s) 80, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as quoted below : "judicial review is not an appeal from a decision of the manner in which the decision is made. Power of judicial review is meant to ensure that the individual receives fair treatment and not to ensure that the conclusion which the authority reaches is necessarily correct in the eye of law. When an inquiry is conducted on charges of misconduct by a public servant, the Court/tribunal is concerned to determine whether the enquiry was held by a competent officer or whether Rules of natural justice are complied with. Whether the findings or conclusions are based on some evidence, the authority entrusted with the power to hold inquiry has jurisdiction, power and authority to each a finding of fact or conclusion. But the finding must be based on some evidence. Neither the technical Rules of Evidence Act nor of proof of fact or evidence as defined therein, apply to disciplinary proceeding. When the authority accepts that evidence and conclusion receives support therefrom, the disciplinary authority is entitled to hold that the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge. The Court/tribunal in its power of judicial review does not act as appellate authority to reappreciate the evidence and to arrive at its own independent findings on the evidence. The Court/tribunal may interfere where the authority held the proceedings against the delinquent officer in a manner inconsistent with the Rules of natural justice or in violation of statutory Rules prescribing the mode of inquiry or where the conclusion or finding reached by the disciplinary authority is based on no evidence. If the conclusion or finding be such as no reasonable person would have ever reached, the Court/tribunal may interfere with the conclusion or the finding and mould the relief so as to make it appropriate to the facts of reach case. The disciplinary authority is the sole Judge of facts. Where appeal is presented, the appellate authority has co-extensive power to reappreciate the evidence or the nature of punishment. IN a disciplinary inquiry, the strict proof of legal evidence and findings on that evidence are not relevant. Adequacy of evidence or reliability of evidence cannot be permitted to be canvassed before the Court/tribunal. IN Union of INdia v. H. C. Goel, this Court held at p. 728 that if the conclusion, upon consideration of the evidence reached by the disciplinary authority, is perverse or suffers from patent error the face of the record or based on no evidence at all, a writ of certiorari could be issued. "