(1.) CHAUHAN , J.: This special appeal has been filed against the judgment and order, dated 4 October 2006, of a learned Judge of this Court, by which the writ petition filed by the present appellant for issuing a direction upon the respondents to grant him permission to have a lawyer as a defence nominee in disciplinary proceedings, has been dismissed.
(2.) THE facts and circumstances giving rise to this case are that the petitioner -appellant, who is working as head cashier category 'E', had been served with a chargesheet on 1 April 2006 and the respondent No. 5 had been appointed as inquiry officer. The petitioner -appellant made a representation before the respondent No. 4, the disciplinary authority, requesting him to accord permission to seek assistance from a lawyer. However, the said representation was rejected vide order, dated 28 April 2006. Being aggrieved, the petitioner -appellant challenged the said order by filing an appeal before the appellate authority and the appellate authority rejected the same vide order, dated 20 May 2006. The said orders were challenged by filing the writ petition, which has been dismissed on the ground that the department was not being represented by lawyers and the case did not involve complicated legal issues as it was merely a case of financial irregularities. The learned Single Judge held that the provisions applicable for holding the enquiry is governed by C1.(12) of the Memorandum of Settlement reached between the parties, which is binding on them in view of the provisions of S. 18 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The said clause provides that a lawyer may be engaged as a defence nominee only with the permission of the bank otherwise the employee can be represented through the registered trade union and is such the order of rejection of his application for seeking lawyer 's assistance was not unreasonable and arbitrary.
(3.) ON the contrary, Sri B. N. Singh, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner -appellant has vehemently submitted that the appeal filed by the petitioner -appellant was not a statutory appeal but was merely a representation, and, therefore, the preliminary objection raised by the learned counsel for the respondents is not tenable. On merit, it ids submitted that as the appellant is not acquainted with the technical Rules of disciplinary proceedings, his application for seeking assistance of a lawyer ought to have been allowed and, therefore, the appeal deserves to be allowed.