(1.) K. L Sharma, J. This writ petition has been filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India against the judgment and order, dated May 21, 1993 passed by the State Public Services Tribunal, Jawahar Bhawan, Lucknow in Claim Petition No. 284/f/iv/1983 vide Annexure 4 to the petition, whereby the learned Tribunal has refused to entertain the claim petition and dismiss the same on the ground that it is not maintainable by the petitioner, who is a workmen.
(2.) THE grievance of the petitioner is that even though he is a workman within the definition of Section 2 (k) of the Industrial Disputes Act and Sec tion l (4) (e) of the U. P. Public Services (Tribunals) Act, he is also a public servant and can legally file a claim petition before the State Public Services Tribunal in respect of his reliefs relating to his service conditions which are not governed by the provisions of Industrial Disputes Act. THE learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that the learned Tribunal has failed to appreciate the distinction between the claim of a workman and the claim of a public servant and has merely been influenced by the definition on the word "workman" as defined under the Industrial Disputes Act, and the Public Services (Tribunals) Act. THE learnad Counsel has further pointed out that the learned Tribunal has not properly appreciated the decision of the Division Bench in the case of Surendrapal Singh v. State of U. P. rendered by the Division Bench of this Court and reported in 1988 (56) FLR (Allahabad High Court) 463, and the earlier Full Bench decision in the case of Ram Krishna Yadav v. THE U. P. State Road Transport Corporation through its Chairman, Lucknow, 1981 LLT (Services), Allahabad High Court, Lucknow Bench) 101, and the Supreme Court decision in the case or the Premier Auto mobiles Limited v. Kamlakar Shantaram Wadkt, AIR 1975 SC 2238 and M/s. Avon Services Production Agencies (P) Ltd. v. Industrial Tribunal, Haryana, 1979 SCC (L and S) 15.
(3.) IN the case of Premier Automobiles (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court merely added that there will hardly be a dispute which will be an indus trial dispute within the meaning of Section 2 (k) of the INdustrial Disputes Act and yet will be one arising out of a right or liability under the general or com mon law only and not under the INdustrial Disputes Act. It wag held that cases of industrial disputes by and large almost invariably are bound to be covered by principle (3) stated above.