(1.) THE petitioner has challenged the order dated 28.8.1995 (Annexure 8 to the writ petition) passed by the D.D.C. BY the supplementary affidavit, another prayer has also been made for quashing the order dated 20.11.1995 passed by the D.D.C. refusing to recall the order impugned.
(2.) THE facts of the case are not disputed. THE consolidation proceedings in the village were closed by publication of notification under Section 52 of the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act on 9.11.1979. It is said that after denotification under Section 52 of the Act was published, an order had been passed by the D.D.C. dated 30.6.1992. THE said order has also been annexed as Annexure 4 to the writ petition. It appears from the perusal of the said order that in the reference proceedings a portion of the land was to be given to the S. S. P., Varanasi, as mentioned in the letter dated 27.10.1975, for construction of the quarters for Police Station, Orai. THE orders were passed by the D.D.C. on the reference sent to him by the order dated 30.6.1992 without any notice to the contesting O. Ps. No. 2 to 5. An application was submitted by O. Ps. No. 2 to 5 before the D.D.C. to recall the order dated 30.6.1992. THE said application was allowed and the order dated 30.6.1992 was recalled by the D.D.C. THE learned counsel for the petitioners strenuously argued that after denotification of the village under Section 52 of the Act, the D.D.C. had no jurisdiction to pass any order. He could not recall or modify any order he or his predecessor had passed earlier. THE learned counsel for the petitioner cited a decision reported in Hart Ram v. D.D.C, Azamgarh, 1989 RD 281. THE Division Bench in the said case was considering the question whether after denotification of the village under Section 52 of the Act, the D.D.C. could pass any order in the matter. THE Division Bench was of the view that after finding that the village has been denotified, if the authority finds that the land which is the subject-matter of the dispute is covered under the notification, he shall desist from exercising any power under Section 48 (3) of the Act. With this view, the case was finally disposed of.
(3.) THE learned counsel for the petitioner Sri Faujdar Rai lastly submitted that the application for recall of the order of 1992 was highly belated and there was no justification for the D.D.C. to recall the order passed in 1992 without considering the laches and delay. THE argument is not well-founded. THE order, which was passed in 1992, as found by the D.D.C, was without notice. If an order is passed without notice, and the application is moved at the earliest when the person concerned got knowledge of the same, there is nothing wrong. As such, I am not impressed with the argument advanced. Neither there is any submission nor objection before the D.D.C. when the matter was heard.