LAWS(ALL)-1995-9-140

PT DWARIKA MATH SHASTRI Vs. GOVT OF INDIA

Decided On September 04, 1995
PT DWARIKA MATH SHASTRI Appellant
V/S
GOVT OF INDIA Respondents

JUDGEMENT

(1.) D. K. Seth, J. The petitioner in this writ petition has prayed for a direction upon the respondents namely, the Government of India through the Ministry of Finance, President, Indian Congress Committee, Sri Yishwanath Pratap Singh and Sri Chandra Shekhar, Ex. Prime Ministers, Government of India, Samajwadi Party through President Sri Devi Lal, Ex. Deputy Prime Minister, Government of India, President, Bhartiya Janta Party and President, Communist Party of India, to maintain cohesion with the petitioner in the national interest as well as public in solving the country's internal and external problems within the approachable period.

(2.) THE petitioner sought to move this writ petition as a public interest litigation. By now exception has been made to the strict rules relating to affidavit and locus standi and the like in the case of class litigation termed as 'public Interest Litigation' in which public in general are interested for vindication of some tight or enforcement of some public duties. Following the Supreme Court which entertained such litigations, the High Courts have also entertained such litigations and such practice is approved by the Supreme Court.

(3.) IN the case of State of Himachal Pradesh v. Parent of a student of Medical College, Simla and others, 1983 (3) SCC 169, it was held : "the direction given by the Division Bench was really nothing short of an indirect attempt to compel the State Government to initiate legislation with a view to curbing the evil of regging. . . . . . . . . . . . This the Division Bench was clearly not entitled to do. It is entirely a matter for the executive branch of the Government to decide whether or not to introduce any particular legislation. Of course, any member of the Legislature can also introduce legisla tion but the court certainly cannot mandate the executive or any member of the Legislature to initiate legislation, howsoever necessary or desirable the court may consider it to be. That is not a matter which is within the sphere of the functions and duties allocated to the judiciary under the Constitution. If the executive is not carrying out any duty laid upon it by the Constitu tion or the law, the court can certainly require the executive to carry out such duty and this is precisely what the court does when it entertains public interest litigation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . the court certainly can and must intervene and compel the executive to carry out its constitutional and legal obligations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . When the court passes any orders in public interest litigation, the court does so not with a view to mocking at legislative or executive authority or in a sprit of confrontation but with a view to enforcing the Constitution and the law, because it is vital for the maintenance of the rule of law that the obligations which are laid upon the executive by the Constitution and the law should be carried out faithfully. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . But at the same time the court cannot usurp the functions assigned to the Executive and the Legislature under the Constitution and it cannot even indirectly require the executive to introduce a particu lar legislation or the Legislature to pass it or assume to itself a supervisory role over the law-making activities of the executive and the Legislature. "