STATE OF U.P. THROUGH THE SECY. TO GOVERNMENT, REVENUE DEPTT. AND ORS. Vs. AYODHYA PRASAD UPADHYAY AND ANR.

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THE State of Uttar Pradesh is aggrieved by an order dated 31st of March, 1979 passed by the Uttar Pradesh Public Services Tribunal allowing the claim of Ayodhya Prasad Upadhya and directing the State to pay the full pay and allowances after adjusting the suspension allowance already paid to him for the entire period 01.12.1968 to 01.06.1975. It has, accordingly, approached this Court for relief Under Article 226 of the Constitution.

(2.) BRIEFLY stated, the facts giving rise to the present petition are that Respondent No. 1 was officiating as Assistant Consolidation Officer. On 1st of December, 1968 he was placed under suspension and certain criminal proceedings Under Section 161/109 IPC and Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act were initiated against him. The criminal court convicted the Respondent and sentenced him to two years' rigorous imprisonment with a fine of Rs. 110/ -. The Respondent went up in appeal before the High Court. His appeal was allowed on 9th of April, 1974 and he was acquitted of the criminal charges leveled against him. Thereafter the Consolidation Commissioner, by his order dated 22nd of April, 1975 reinstated the Respondent in service with full pay and allowances but further directed that he would be entitled to full pay only for three years preceding the date of resumption of duty after reinstatement. The Respondent then filed a petition before the U.P. Public Services Tribunal and claimed that the Consolidation Commissioner should have allowed him full pay for the entire period during which he remained under suspension. He also asserted that the Defendants did not pay him even the amount which they had been directed to pay by the Consolidation Commissioner.

(3.) LEARNED Counsel appearing for the Petitioner submitted that inasmuch as the pay and allowances due to the Respondent for the period prior to three years of the date of his reinstatement had become barred by time, the Tribunal was not justified in interfering with the order of the Consolidation Commissioner and granting the relief to the claimant. In this regard he relied upon Article 7 of Part II of the Schedule to the Limitation Act which provides for a limitation of three years for entertaining suits for recovery of wages. According to the said Article the limitation is to commence when the wages accrue due. The principal question involved in the instant case is as to the date when the difference in the wages already paid to the Respondent and to which he was eventually found entitled to, accrued due to him. So long as the Respondent was under suspension and he had not been reinstated after acquittal by the High Court, he was not entitled to receive the difference between his salary due to him and the suspension allowance which was being paid to him. It cannot be said that during that period any amount over and above what was being paid to him had accrued due. He became entitled to the said difference the moment he was acquitted and he was directed to be reinstated with full back wages. It is at this stage that the difference between the amount already paid to him and his full salary accrued due to him. It is not disputed that the present claim petition had been filed within three years of the date on which he was actually reinstated. In this view of the matter, it cannot be said that any part of the claim made by the Respondent had become barred by time. The judgment of the Tribunal, therefore, does not stand vitiated on this account.