(1.) IN these two cases the following question has been referred to us for answer :-
(2.) HAVING heard counsel for the parties we are of opinion that in view of a later decision of the Supreme Court in Vineet Kumar v. Mangal Sain, AIR 1985 (SC) 817 : 1984(1) RCR 302 the question referred to us has to be in conformity with the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Vineet Kumar (supra). In that case, according to the finding of the Additional District Judge the building in question was to be deemed to have been completed on the date of assessment of the house which date was 1st of October, 1971 as stated in paragraph 12 of the report. The suit was filed on the allegation that the building was constructed in 1971 and the defendant was inducted as a tenant thereof on 7th February, 1972. It was further stated in the plaint that the tenant had defaulted in the payment of rent despite notice dated 24th March, 1977 as a result of which his tenancy was terminated and suit for his ejectment was filed. Apparently, therefore, the suit for ejectment was instituted in that case on some date after 24th March, 1977 which was the date of service of notice and was thus not pending on 15th July, 1972 which is the date of commencement of U.P. Act XIII of 1972 according to the notification issued under Section 1(4) of the said Act During the pendency of either the suit or the revision under Section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act ten years from the date on which the building was deemed to have been completed expired and the question arose as to whether the tenant, was entitled to the benefit of Sections 39 and 40 of the Act. It was held by the Supreme Court even after noticing its earlier decision in the case of Om Parkash Gupta (supra) in paragraph 17 of the report that the appellant was entitled to the benefit of those Sections. Even though it has not been specifically stated in the said decision that the words "the date of commencement of the Act" used in Section 39/40 were not confined to July 15, 1972 but were to be equated to the date on which the particular building becomes subject to the provisions of the Act within the meaning of Section 2(2) thereof, the decision in substance is to that effect. It is precisely this question, as already seen above which is referred to us.
(3.) IN the normal course, therefore, on an interpretation of sub-section (4) of Section 1 of U.P. Act XIII of 1972 together with the notification issued under the said sub-section and the definition of the term 'commencement' in sub-tenant (10) of Section 4 of the U.P. General Clauses Act, the words "the date of the commencement of this Act" used in Sections 39/40 of U.P. Act XIII of 1972 would have been 15th July, 1972 alone. But in our opinion the case falls within the purview of the term "unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context" used in the opening part of Section 4 of the U.P. General Clauses Act which contains the general definitions. In this connection it may be pointed out that Sections 39 and 40 inter alia contemplate that the building in respect of which the suit for ejectment was pending on the relevant date should be one to which the old Act, namely U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947 (U.P. Act III of 1947) did not apply.