BHANU PRATAP SINGH Vs. PANNA DEVI

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This first appeal from order has been preferred under S. 83 of the Lunacy Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act) against the order dt. 16th July, 1983 passed by the District Judge, Gorakhpur appointing Smt. Panna Devi, respondent 1 and Parasu Ram, respondent 2 who are the wife and soft respectively of Rajbanshi Singh, respondent 3 as guardians of respondent 3 and managers of his property on the finding that Rajbanshi Singh, respondent 3 was a lunatic. The appellants were not parties to the proceedings before the trial court nor do they claim any blood relationship with the respondents. They assert to be transferees of some property in pursuance of a sale deed said to have been executed on 26th Sept. 1983, by Rajbanshi Singh respondent 3. The sale deed aforesaid had apparently been executed after about two months of the passing of the order appealed against. It was not executed by the guardians and managers of Rajbanshi Singh but as seen above, purports, to have been executed by Rajbanshi Singh himself. We are informed by counsel for the appellants that on 22nd Dec. 1983 a suit was instituted by the respondents for cancellation of the sale deed aforesaid.

(2.) A preliminary objection has been raised by counsel for the respondents that this appeal is not maintainable as the appellants have no locus standi to challenge the order appealed against dt. 16th July, 1983. Having heard counsel for the parties we are of opinion that there is substance in the preliminary objection. The appellants were admittedly not parties to the proceedings in which the order appealed against was passed. In reply to this objection counsel for the appellants pointed out that S.83 of the Act under which the present appeal has been preferred provides. "An appeal shall lie to the High Court from any order made by a district court under this chapter." On its basis, it was urged that since the order appealed against had been passed under Chapt. V of the Act in which S. 83 occurs, any person aggrieved by the order could file an appeal even if he was not a party to the proceedings in which the order appealed against was passed. That a person aggrieved by an order can file an appeal even if he is not a party, unless the right of appeal has been confined to a party alone, admits of no doubt. In Jatan Kunwar v. Golcha Properties, AIR 1971 SC 374 on a report of the Official Liquidator under S. 457 of the Companies Act the Company Judge ordered sale of lease hold rights of a company under liquidation but no notice of the proceedings was given to the landlord either by the Official Liquidator or by the Court. It was held that the landlord was entitled to appeal under S. 483 against the order of sale.

(3.) The crucial question which, however, falls for consideration is as to whether the appellants, can be held to be 'persons aggrieved' by the order appealed against so as to entitle them to prefer this appeal. A person aggrieved is a person who has been prejudiced on account of the order appealed against. Before a person can be said to be aggrieved or prejudiced by the order appealed against, he has to show that on the date when the order appealed against was passed he had some right which has been adversely affected by the order appealed against. Prejudice cannot be in the vacuum. On the other hand it implies the existence of some right which is affected by an order and it is only then that the person whose existing right has been affected by the order can claim himself to be a person aggrieved. As seen above, in the instant case the appellants did not have any right whatsoever either with regard to the guardianship of respondent 3 or with regard to the management of his properties. He had not even purchased any property belonging to respondent 3 prior to the order appealed against which may have been affected by the order appealed against. In this view of the matter it cannot be said that any preexisting right, whatsoever, of the appellants was affected by the order appealed against. As a necessary corollary it is difficult to take the view that the appellants are even then persons aggrieved by the order appealed against so as to entitle them to prefer an appeal against the said order.