B K SHARMA Vs. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The petitioner was employed as a junior clerk by M/s. Glaxo Laboratories (India) Private Ltd., Aligarh. His services were terminated on July 31, 1970. He claimed that he was a permanent workmen, hence entitled to continue in service. The employers did not accept his claim. The petitioner approached the State Government for referring the dispute for adjudication. The State Government by its order dated December 23, 1970 referred the matter of dispute to labour Court (1), Kanpur under Section 10(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act (Central), 1947. The dispute referred was as to whether the employers have terminated the petitioner's services improperly and illegally and if so to what benefit or compensation he was entitled. The proceedings before the Labour Court were contested both the workmen as well as by the employers. The Labour Court by its order dated February 8, 1972 gave its award dismissing the petitioner's claim. Aggrieved the petitioner filed this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution challenging the validity of the Award.

(2.) The employers had raised a preliminary objection before the Labour Court that it had no jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the dispute because the dispute was an individual dispute. The Labour Court accepted the employers' contention. In addition to that the Labour Court considered the petitioner's claim on merits and thereafter it recorded findings that initially the petitioner was employed for a fixed period of time after the expiry of that period he was re-employed and the last order of re-employment was issued on June 13, 1970, that order stipulated that the petitioner's services would stand automatically terminated on July 31, 1970 without any notice. The Labour Court considered the evidence produced by the parties in detail and thereafter it recorded findings that the petitioner's services were neither terminated nor he was discharged or retrenched from service, instead his right to continue in service automatically came to an end on July 31, 1970 in pursuance of the condition contained in the order of appointment itself, as such the petitioner was not entitled to any relief. Learned counsel for the petitioner urged that since the petitioner was in continuous employment for a period of more than 90 days and as he had been doing work of a permanent nature, he was entitled to confirmation automatically. This contention had been raised before the Labour Court also but after examining the appointment letters issued from time to time. It rejected the petitioner's claim. On a careful consideration I do not find any error in the findings recorded by the Labour Court. The findings of the Labour Court are well supported by evidence on record. Clause 3-A(b) of the Standing Order defines a permanent workman. Under this Clause only that workman is entitled to be a permanent who is engaged to perform work of a permanent nature and who satisfactorily completes probationary period in the same or another occupation in the establishment and whose appointment is confirmed in writing by the Manager or by a person authorised in that behalf by the Manager. The definition contemplates that the workman must be engaged on a permanent basis to perform some work which may also be permanent nature and that he must satisfactorily complete his probationary period. But even if all these conditions are fulfilled the workman cannot claim status of a permanent workman automatically.

(3.) The Standing Orders contemplates issue of a positive order in writing by the Manager or by any other person authorised by the employers confirming the workman concerned. In the absence of any order of confirmation, no workman can acquire status of a permanent workman tinder clause 3-A(b) of the Standing Orders. In the instant case even assuming that the petitioner was engaged on a permanent basis to perform work of a permanent nature, he was never confirmed by the competent authority. There was no positive order confirming him. In the circumstances the petitioner could not acquire the status of a permanent workman. Learned counsel urged that the petitioner's services were illegally terminated therefore Section 2-A of the Central Act was applicable and the dispute was an industrial dispute. The dispute relating to the petitioner's employment was not taken up or espoused by any Union. No other workman was interested or involved in the petitioner's dispute. Admittedly the dispute was an individual dispute. Under the provisions of Section 2-A of the Central Act even an individual dispute is deemed to be an industrial dispute and the State Government is empowered to refer even an individual dispute for adjudication but before an individual dispute can be referred of adjudicated upon by the labour court the condition precedent as laid down Section 2-A must be fulfilled. Section 2-A contemplates a dispute arising out of discharge, dismissal, retrenchment or termination of an individual workman and it further includes any dispute or difference between the workman or employer connected with or arising out of such discharge, dismissal, retrenchment or termination. The section does not contemplate any dispute relating to other service condition in relation to an individual workman. The legislature intended that any dispute arising out of dismissal, discharge or termination or any matter connected therewith of an individual workman - should be treated an industrial dispute. In the instant case, the Labour Court has recorded a finding that the petitioner was employed for - a fixed period of time with a condition that his right to continue in service would automatically come to an end on the expiry of that period and as such the employers did not discharge, dismiss, retrench 01. terminate petitioners' services. I find no error in the view taken by the Labour Court. The employers had filed the original appointment order before the Labour Court which contained a condition that the petitioner's services were engaged for a fixed period of time and on the expiry of that period petitioner's right to continue in service will come to an end. The petitioner had signed the appointment letter. The Labour Court considered these aspects and thereafter it recorded its findings that the petitioner was neither dismissed nor discharged from service. Learned counsel for the petitioner urged that the Labour Court failed to frame issue or to record any finding on the plea of unfair Labour' practice raised by the petitioner workman. I find no substance in this contention. The petitioner did not raise any question of unfair labour practice in his written statement filed before the Labour Court. In paragraph 4 of his rejoinder filed before the Labour Court, he raised a plea that the employers adopted tactics to get the signature of the workman concerned on several appointment letters at the time of first employment so that he could easily be hired and fired at their pleasure and they adopted the same prevalent unfair labour practice and obtained the petitioner's signatures on several printed appointment letters at the time of his appointment and they did not issue copy of the same on demand at the time of termination of his services. The averments contained in paragraph 4 of the petitioner's rejoinder did not specifically raise any plea of unfair labour practice What the petitioner asserted was that his signatures were obtained on certain printed forms both at the time of his employment and also at the time of termination of his services without giving a copy of the same to him. The Labour Court examined this assertion on the basis of the evidence on record. In his oral statement before the Labour Court the petitioner asserted that he had taken up the plea of unfair labour practice on the advice of some other persons and he could not point out any unfair Labour practice except that he stated that his signatures had been obtained on certain forms. The Labour Court recorded a finding that the petitioner had signed the forms and written the word 'accepted' whereby he accepted the terms and conditions of his employment. His sole oral testimony that he was not allowed to read the terms and conditions was not accepted by the Labour Court. The petitioner failed to raise any grievance of unfair Labour practice and he further failed to substantiate before the Labour Court the averment contained in paragraph 4 of his rejoinder. In the circumstances the petitioner is not entitled to raise this grievance in the present proceedings.