GORAKH NATH YAGNIK Vs. STATE OF U P

JUDGEMENT

(1.) BY these petitions under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, the petitioners, who are the ten ant of the buildings in question, have challenged the constitutional validity of Explanation (iv) to sub-section (1) of Section 21 of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (to be hereinafter referred as the Act) and which repealed the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act (described hereinafter as the 1947 Act), on the ground that it violates the funda mental rights of the petitioner, guaranteed under Article 14 and 19 of the Constitution. Counsel for the petitioners conceded and, in our opinion, right ly that since the proclamation of emergency is in operation, under Article 353 of the Constitution, the fundamental right guaranteed under Article 19 is under suspension and, therefore, the explanation could not be assailed for infraction of Article 19. Counsel, however, submitted that it does violate the guarantee of equal protection of the law and offends Article 14 and in his endeavour for attacking the provision as being violative of Article 14 he has maintained that there is a discrimination in favour of the landlord who is in occupa tion of a part of the building for residential purposes and that there is no rational basis for enacting a rule of irrebuttable presumption that the building is 'bona fide required' by him when in other cases the landlord, in order to obtain the eviction of the tenant from the building under tenancy, is required to prove under sub-section (2) (a) of the section that the building is bona fide required by him. In the course of arguments, counsel for the petitioners also raised the con tention, which we permitted them to do, that Rule 16 (1) of the Rules framed under the Act, in so far as it precludes the prescribed autho rity from taking into account the likely hardship to the tenant from the grant of the application in a case covered by Clause (iv) of the explanation, is ultra vires of Section 21 (1) (a) of the Act.

(2.) LEARNED Advocate General appearing for the State and the counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents submitted that none of the points urged on behalf of the petitioners has got any substance and there was no violation of the equal protection of laws in Article 14 of the Constitution. For the sake of convenient reference and before we proceed to see the legislative history of the Act, it would be relevant to set out the impugned provision:

(3.) IN the aforementioned perspective, we now proceed to have a look at the scheme of Section 21 of the Act, which was two-fold situa tion, (1) a building or any specified part thereof may be released under clause (a) when the prescribed authority is satisfied that such building or part is bona fide required, (i) either in its existing form: or (ii) after demolition and new construction. Such requirement may be for purposes of occupation; (i) by the landlord himself; (ii) in the case of trust, for the objects of the trust. In the first three cases, the building may be released for purposes of residence as well as for purposes of any profession, trade or calling, the landlord thus has not only to prove that there was an element of need and the applica tion was not made with the purpose of rack renting or ejectment with a view to indulge into rack-renting, but he has also to establish that the accommodation was needed for the purpose set out in clause (a). In other words, it is not enough that the landlord should merely de sire bona fide to use and occupy the premises. What is necessary is that be should need them for his own use and occupation or by any member of his family or by any person for whose benefit the build ing was held by him. In such an enquiry both sides must adduce relevant evidence before the prescribed authority; the landlord must show that other reasonable accommodation was not available to him and the tenant must also adduce evidence to that effect. It is only after sifting such evidence that the prescribed authority must form its conclusion as to whether much hardship would be caused by re leasing the accommodation then by refusing to release it. (2) The Explanation to the sub-section in the case of a residential building provides in clause (ii) that where the landlord was engaged in any profession, trade, calling or employment, in the city, municipality, notified area or town area within which the building is situate and by reason of the cessation of such engagement he needs the buildings of occupation by himself for residential purposes, such need shall be deemed sufficient for purposes of clause (a) and in a similar way in clause (lii) it indicates that where the landlord is a member of the armed forces of the Union and the prescribed authority under the Indian Soldiers (Litigation) Act, 1925, has issued a certificate in his favour that he is serving under special conditions within the meaning of Section 3 of the Act, then his representation that he needs the building for residential purposes for members of his family shall be deemed sufficient for purposes of clause (a). In these two classes of cases the landlord's need has been declared as sufficient relieving the landlord of the obligation to prove it by evidence as has been re quired by sub-section (1) (a).