SHEO MURAT UPADHAYA Vs. STATE

JUDGEMENT

(1.) JANTA Laghu Madhyamik Vidalaya, Ranipar is an educational institution. Sri Ram Karan Singh, M.L.A. was the first President of the Managing Committee and Sheo Murat Upadhaya was its Secretary. Sri Ram Karan Singh was later on re moved from the office of the Presidentship and it is said that Sri Brij Pal Singh was set up by him as Manager-cum-Secretary of the insti tution. There was a serious dispute between Sheo Murat Upadhaya and Brij Pat Singh for the management of the aforesaid institution. On June 29, 1972 the Station Officer, Sahajanwa submitted a report in which it was mentioned that there was a serious apprehension of the breach of peace from the side of Sheo Murat Upadhaya and Brij Pat Singh, who were both claiming the right to manage the aforesaid institution. On a perusal of the report of the Station Officer, the Magistrate first class, Gorakhpur passed a preliminary order on June 29. 1972 and directed attachment of the School under Section 145(1), Cr.P.C. He directed the parties to file their written statements and affidavits in support of their respective claims. Sheo Murat Upa dhaya filed a written statement on July 7, 1972 in which he alleged that the proceedings under Section 145, Cr.P.C. are totally miscon ceived. It was also pleaded in his written statement that there was no apprehension of the breach of peace from his side and that he had been in continuous management of the institution. On the same day an application under sub-clause (5) of Section 145, Cr.P.C. was filed on behalf of Brij Pat Singh in which it was also alleged that the dis pute between the parties was '"not a matter of some quarrel or con test between the parties of possession on immovable property, but it was a matter of rights between the parties constituting the members of the Management Committee as to who should be allowed to con tinue the management.' It was further mentioned in this application that the question of attachment of the institution did not arise. It was alleged therein that if at all attachment was necessary then that could only be affected under Section 147, Cr.P.C. and not under Sec tion 145, Cr.P.C. as the dispute between the parties related to the right of management. It was also mentioned in this application that 'if any apprehension of the breach of peace is found to exist between two individuals a case under Section 1071117, Cr.P.C. should have been started rather than attaching the institution itself against pub lic policy and the spirit of law.' On this basis the prayer was that the proceedings under Section 145, Cr.P.C. be dropped. No order appears to have been passed on this application so far. A written statement has also been filed on behalf of Brij Pat Singh in which a plea has been taken that the proceedings under Section 145, Cr.P.C. are misconceived, that, if at all the proceedings can only be taken under Section 147, Cr.P.C. that the dispute in question relates to the rights of management of the institution and as such Section 145, Cr.P.C. is not applicable and the proceedings there under should be quashed. It was also mentioned in this application that there is no apprehension of the breach of peace.

(2.) FEELING aggrieved by the preliminary order of the Magistrate dated June 29, 1972 attaching the institution a revision was filed by Sheo Marat Upadhaya before the Sessions Judge, Gorakhpur which has been dismissed on July 28, 1972. Hence the present revision.

(3.) ON behalf of the opposite party No. 2 reliance is placed upon a Single Judge decision Gurdev Singh v. State of Punjab, 1975 Punj. Law Reports 112. It was held therein that the order under Section 145 (1) was not vitiated merely because the grounds were not repeated in the preliminary order, though they were mentioned in the Police report. In my opi nion this case is not applicable. In the present case the Magistrate has mentioned the reasons for satisfaction and they are to the effect that there is a dispute between the parties with regard to the rights of the parties to manage the institution which is likely to lead to an apprehension of the breach of peace. In view of these reasons which have been given by the Magistrate after a perusal of the Police re port there can be no doubt that Section 145, Cr.P.C. would not ap ply to the facts of the present case.