(1.) THIS is an appeal by a young wife against her husband seeking divorce and in the alternative judicial separation. The marriage of the appellant with the respondent took place on 13th May, 1969 in accordance with Hindu Law and custom. She came to reside with the respondent at his house in village Bhadora on 14th May, 1969 and lived with him till 19th May, 1969 when she returned to her father's place. Thereafter she again lived with her husband from 12th June, 1969 to 22nd July, 1969. Again, she lived with him for some time till 22nd November, 1969. She went to Anupshahr to attend the marriage of the son of Bishan Swarup and returned to her father's place on 13th May, 1969 (?) and since then she has been residing with her father. Her allegations against the respondent were that he ill-treated her, called her ugly and black and also accused her of unchastity. He caused physical injuries to her, gave her beating off and on and once sprinkled kerosene oil on her and tried to burn her. She also alleged that the respondent had illicit connections with other ladies and when she objected to the same she was mercilessly beaten and abused and called unchaste and was threatened that her nose would be chopped off and she would be killed. Persistent arid repeated ill-treatment by the respondent made her believe that if she would live with him she would be killed. The cruel behaviour of the respondent inflicting physical and mental torture on her has left an impact on her mind that it would be injurious and harmful to her if she would live with him as his wife. She, therefore, filed a petition under Sections 10 and 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act for the aforementioned reliefs. The petition was contested by the respondent denying the allegations made against him
(2.) THE trial court, on a consideration of the evidence on the record recorded a finding that the petitioner had failed to prove that the respondent was living in adultery. It, however, held that the false accusation against the chastity of the petitioner amounted to cruelty and that the evidence on the record established that the petitioner was treated with cruelty by the respondent, that she was beaten and was threatened and that she was called unchaste. It, therefore, recorded a finding that the respondent treated the petitioner with cruelty both physical and mental. The accusation of unchastity amounted to mental cruelty and it gave reasonable apprehension in the mind of the petitioner that it would be quite harmful and injurious for her to live with the respondent. On these findings the trial court granted a decree of divorce to the petitioner. Against that decision an appeal was preferred by the present respondent Sri Krishna Swarup. The learned District Judge, who heard the appeal, concurred with the trial court that it was not proved that the husband, who is the respondent before me lived in adultery. As a consequence of this finding the learned District Judge further held that Krishan Swarup had, therefore, no occasion for subjecting his wife to any mental or physical torture. Disagreeing with the trial court he, therefore, held that in the instant case the wife was not ill-treated by the husband. Dealing with the grievance that the respondent had falsely accused his wife of unchastity the learned District Judge held that he did not accuse her of unchastity. The learned District Judge, therefore, allowed the appeal and set aside the decree passed by the trial court. Aggrieved, the petitioner has come up to this Court in second appeal.
(3.) THE learned District Judge has obviously misread the hand-written portion of the said notice Ex. 1. The respondent had not used the word 'chal chalan' but had used the word 'badchalan'. He had written that despite her being unchaste he was prepared to take her along with him. The word 'badchalan' does not mean misbehaviour. It connotes unchastity. It is true that the hand-written sentence was scored out by drawing a straight line from one end to the other but it was not so scored out as not to be deciphered. The sentence was meant to be read. Otherwise it would either have not been written or it would have been scored in such a way that no one could despite efforts made in that behalf read it. It is a strong circumstance corroborative of the fact that the respondent maligned the appellant of being unchaste. There is truth in the statement of the appellant that the respondent did accuse her of being unchaste. There is no evidence on the record that the said accusation was correct.