KESHAV PRASAD Vs. DISTRICT JUDGE VARANASI

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS petition arises out of an election petition presented under Rule 35 of the U.P. Keshtra Samities (Election of Pramukhs and Up-Pramukhs and Settlement of Election Disputes) Rules, 1962 hereinafter referred to as the Rules. By means of the election petition, opposite party No. 3 challenged the declara tion of the petitioner as Pramukh of the Kshetriya Samiti concern ed. The election petitioner paid a court-fee of Rs. 75.00. In the writ-' ten statement filed, the petitioner challenged the maintainability of the election petition on the ground that it was insufficiently stamped. An issue was framed by the Election Tribunal with regard to the sufficiency or otherwise of the court-fee affixed to the election peti tion. It was found that under Article 22, Schedule II of the Court-fee Act, opposite-party No. 3 should have fixed a court-fee stamp of Rs. 200/ - instead of Rs. 75 -. The Election Tribunal allowed opposite party No. 3 time to make good the deficiency by November 6, 1973. Against that order, the petitioner filed a revision which was dismiss ed by the learned First Additional District Judge, Varanasi on October 21, 1973. Aggrieved by the orders of the Election Tribunal and the learned First Additional District Judge, Varanasi, the petitioner has filed this writ petition.

(2.) LEARNED counsel for the petitioner contended that since the elec tion petition was found to be deficiently stamped, the Election Tribu nal had no option but to reject it and had no power to grant time to opposite party No. 3 to make good the deficiency. It was urged that the Election Tribunal as well as the learned Additional District Judge have erred in law in taking the view that by reason of Section 149 of the Code of Civil Procedure, it was open to the Election Tribunal to grant time to the election petitioner to make good the deficiency in court-fee. There is, in our opinion, no force in this contention. Rule 40 of the Rules runs as follows:

(3.) THE learned Judge placed reliance on Wharton's Law Lexicon in which the expression 'hearing' has also been defined as having been used in the sense of trial. Jagdish Sahai, J. also with approval relied upon the meaning of the word 'hearing' as given in Rama Natha Iyer's Law Lexicon 1940 Edition in which it has been said that,