KUAR KISHORI RAZDAN Vs. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS writ petition has been filed by the landlady against the order of the Rent Control and Eviction Officer dated 12-7-1973. The dispute is with regard to a portion of house no. 23, Hamilton Road, Allahabad. THIS house admittedly belongs to the petitioner. It is in the tenancy of Sri Babu Ram Awasthi, respondent no. 3.

(2.) ON 18-11-1972 an application was made by Gaya Prasad Yadav, the respondent no. 4, for allotment of a portion of the aforesaid house on the ground that he had been let in possession of the same by Babu Ram Awasthi on behalf of the landlady and that he was continuously living in the said portion since 1971, therefore, the allotment order be issued in his name. It was also mentioned in this application that as the possession of the respondent no. 4 was with the consent of the agent of the landlady, therefore, he may be deemed to be in authorised occupation of that portion. The Rent Control and Eviction Officer issued notice on the aforesaid application to the petitioner. She filed an objection to the application of Gaya Prasad Yadav on a number of grounds including that Babu Ram Awasthi was not her agent and, therefore, the consent given by Babu Ram Awasthi was not binding on her. She further asserted that the subletting of the portion done by Babu Ram Awasthi was illegal, accordingly, the possession of respondent no. 4 was that of a trespasser and he was liable to be evicted. The Rent Control and Eviction Officer by the order dated 12-7-1973 held that Gaya Prasad Yadav was in possession of the portion in dispute since 1971 with the consent of one Maqbul Husain, who was the agent of the landlady, therefore, the same was covered by Section 14 of the new Act. In this view of the matter the Rent Control and Eviction Officer did not pass any order on the application for allotment made by Gaya Prasad Yadav. He, as stated above, only declared the possession of Gaya Prasad Yadav, as authorised.

(3.) LEARNED counsel for the contesting respondent also alleged that an order passed under Section 14 of the New Act was appealable before the District Judge, therefore, the writ petition is not maintainable. He could not, however, point out any section under which such an appeal lay. Any determination that the possession of a person is covered by Section 14 of the New Act has not been made appealable under any of the provisions of the said Act. As a fact Section 14 of the New Act does not contemplate any determination. Therefore I do not find any substance in this argument of the learned counsel for the respondent. Further the mere existence of an alternative remedy is no bar to the maintainability of the writ petition and I consider the present case as a fit one for exercise of the discretion under Art. 226 of the Constitution. I over-rule the second argument raised by the learned counsel for the respondent.