LAWS(ALL)-1965-9-25

KHEM CHAND KESHRIMAL Vs. COMMISSIONER OF SALES TAX

Decided On September 16, 1965
KHEM CHAND KESHRIMAL Appellant
V/S
COMMISSIONER OF SALES TAX Respondents

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS is a statement of case submitted to this Court by the Judge (Revisions) Sales Tax, U.P., at the instance of the assessee. The question referred to us is -

(2.) OUR answer to the question, for the reasons that we shall give subsequently, is in the affirmative. We direct that a copy of the order be sent under section 11(6) of the Sales Tax Act, under the seal of the Court and the signature of the Registrar to the Judge (Revisions) Sales Tax, U.P., and the Commissioner of Sales Tax, U.P. The assessee shall pay to the Commissioner of Sales Tax, U.P., his costs of this reference which we assess at Rs. 200. Counsel's fee is assessed at Rs. 200. September 16, 1965. DESAI, C.J. - We answered in the affirmative the question formulated by the Judge (Revisions) Sales Tax, U.P., on 30th August, 1965, and said that the reasons for the answer would be given later. We now proceed to give the reasons. The material facts, as stated in the statement, are as follows :- For the assessment year 1952-53 an assessment order under the U.P. Sales Tax Act was passed on 13th October, 1953, assessing the assessee [at whose instance the Judge (Revisions) has submitted this statement, on a turnover of Rs. 14,000]. A copy of the order was despatched on 26th December, 1953, and it was received by the assessee in the first week of January, 1954. (Why the assessing officer took more than two months to despatch the copy and why it took so many days for service are not known). The assessee filed no appeal from the assessment order; instead on 12th September, 1955, it applied to the Judge (Revisions) to revise it. Previously no period of limitation was prescribed for an application for revision but the Act was amended with effect from 1st April, 1954, and now the period of limitation prescribed for an application for revision is one year from the date of service of the order complained of and the Judge (Revisions) is empowered to extend the period by six months at his discretion. Thus when the assessment order was passed and also when it was communicated to the assessee there was no period of limitation for a revision application. On 1st April, 1954, the law was changed and if it applied, the assessee was required to file a revision application within one year from the date of service of the order, i.e., by the end of the first week of January, 1955, but it filed the revision application on 12th September, 1955, and the Judge (Revisions) rejected it as barred by time.

(3.) AS we shall show subsequently there is no vested right to apply for revision of an assessment order under the Sales Tax Act. Further even if it were a vested right it cannot be said to be in respect of a transaction or consideration anterior to 1st April, 1954. The making of an assessment order is not a transaction or consideration giving rise to a right. Assessing a dealer to sales tax does not confer any right upon him; on the contrary it imposes an obligation or duty (to pay a certain sum of money) upon him. Therefore, it cannot be said that the Amendment Act takes away or impairs a vested right acquired or creates a new obligation in respect of a transaction or consideration already past or that it goes behind a present right and gives efficacy to any anterior circumstance to defeat it or relates back to, and gives to, a previous transaction some different legal effect. There is no question of any transaction here; the making of an assessment order is not a transaction at all. "Transaction" means an act such as a contract or transfer. All that the Amendment Act does is that it relates to an antecedent event or draws upon an antecedent fact, the event or fact being the making and service of an assessment order. Merely because it operates upon an antecedent assessment order or service, it is not to be regarded as operating retroactively. Sulaiman, C.J., said in Ram Karan v. Ram Das (A.I.R. 1931 All. 635 at p. 639), that to entertain a suit after a new enactment permitting such a suit is not, strictly speaking, giving to the Act retrospective effect.