K L SAHGAL Vs. STATE OF U P

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THE question before this Bench for its opinion is: "When the State Government deals with a proceeding under Section 3 of the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act under Section 7-F of the same Act, does the State Government act administratively or in a judicial or quasi-judicial capacity?"

(2.) THE petitioner is in occupation of a portion of a house, No. 7/152, Swarup Nagar, Kanpur, as the tenant of the fourth respondent, Mrs. Kalindri Mitter, who is the owner of that house. Mrs. Mitter applied under Section 3 (1) of the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act to the Rent Control and Eviction Officer, Kanpur, for permission to sue the petitioner for her eviction. THE Rent Control and Eviction Officer granted permission. THE petitioner applied in revision to the Commissioner, Allahabad, but the latter upheld the grant of permission. THEn the petitioner applied to the State Government. On June 27, 1961, the State Government, acting under Section 7-F, considered the application and revoked the permission granted to Mrs. Mitter. It appears that subsequently, upon a review application by Mrs. Mitter, the matter was reconsidered by the State Government, and by its order of October 12, 1961, Mrs. Mitter was permitted to file a suit for the petitioner's eviction.

(3.) THE problem is one of ascertainment of the nature of the function. How then is this problem to be approached? In his celebrated article on "Administrative Tribunals and the Courts" (1933) 49 L Q R 94, 419 Mr. D.M. Gorden, Q. C., pointed out that judicial functions involve the decision of rights and liabilities, so that an investigation is a material part of the functions, whereas non-judicial functions may be either ministerial duties or administrative powers. Ministerial duties, he observes, are exercised by taking active, often coercive measures, and administrative powers by meting out policy and expediency, with an unfettered discretion; a judicial body administers justice through the agency of, and in accordance with, legal evidence. When a body is acting ministerially it has no power to consult its own wishes. When it is acting administratively its standards are subjective and it follows its own wishes. But when it is acting judicially it professes to be bound in theory by fixed legal objective standards. It is when an authority has a duty to decide matters judicially, or has certain quasi-judicial powers, that its decision is liable to be reviewed in the ordinary courts. Whether a function is judicial or quasi judicial may be identified by reference to the incidents attaching to its exercise. Those incidents have been broadly summarised by saying that there is a duty in the tribunal to act judicially. It is easy enough to ascertain this if the statute conferring jurisdiction contains such clear requirement. But often the statute is silent and the question has to be decided by reference to a number of circumstances. Over the years, the Courts have evolved various tests for determining whether there is a duty to act judicially. THEy are not conclusive, and indeed having regard to the complexity of different situations which necessitate the conferment of widely differing jurisdiction in modern life, they cannot be. THEy are always subject to a contrary intention expressed in the statute or contained in it by necessary implication.