PRADEEP KUMAR GUPTA Vs. STATE OF U.P.

JUDGEMENT

(1.) Heard Sri Santosh Yadav, learned counsel for the appellant, Sri Vimlendu Tripathi, the learned A.G.A., and Sri Rajiv Lochan Shukla, the learned Amicus Curiae.

(2.) The appellant claims to be a petty food vendor engaged in the business under the Act; on 9.11.2012 the Food Safety Officer inspected his shop, purchased a sample of paneer, which as per report of public analyst was found to contain fats less than the prescribed limit of 50% hence, sample was found to be sub-standard. On the basis of the report and after requisite sanction from the Designated Officer under the Act, a complaint dated 10.11.2012 was filed by the Food Safety Officer before the Adjudicating Officer/Additional District Magistrate. The Adjudicating Officer after notice and hearing the appellant passed an order dated 19.2.2015 imposing a penalty of Rs. 5 lacs. The appellant preferred an appeal under Section 70(1) before the Food Safety Appellate Tribunal (FSAT) i.e. the District Judge, Agra The F.S.A.T., vide its order dated 17.3.2015 passed a conditional order that the appeal be admitted subject to deposit of 50% of the penalty, which is impugned herein.

(3.) Sri Vimlendu Tripathi, learned A.G.A. at the threshold submits that although an appeal is maintainable against the order dated 17.3.2015 under Section 71(6) of the Act before this Court but the same could not be nomenclature and filed as "criminal appeal" thus the appeal as framed and filed is not cognizable by this bench, rather it is to be treated as an Appeal from Order on the civil side of the jurisdiction. To buttress his objection, learned A.G.A., submits that the Act of 2006 is a substantial departure from the Act of 1954 in many respect, and one of the new concepts, introduced under the new Act, is that proceedings could go on both for criminal prosecution of an offence under the Act and also for adjudication on the quantum of penalty. In this connection, he referred to the various provisions of the Act, reference of which would be given at an appropriate stage. He thus submits that the power of adjudication for determining the quantum of penalty contained in Chapter-X of the Act upon the Adjudicating Officer in the first instance and upon the Food Safety Appellate Tribunal/the Appellate Authority, in the second instance has no nexus whatsoever with the criminal prosecution, which is ordinarily followed by conviction and sentence, whereas "adjudication" is followed only by penalty. He also submits that both the Adjudicating Officer and Food Safety Appellate Tribunal while deciding the proceedings of adjudication on determination of quantum of penalty are acting like a Civil Court, hence appeals preferred from such orders could not be nomenclature as criminal appeal. In this connection, he placed reliance on the judgments of the Apex Court in the case of Director of Enforcement v. M.C.T.M. Pvt. Ltd., 1996 SCC(Cri) 344; Chairman SEBI v. Sri Ram Mutual Fund and another, 2006 5 SCC 361 and Radhey Shyam Kejriwal and another v. West Bengal and another, 2011 3 SCC 581 to demonstrate the nature of adjudication proceedings.