COMMITTEE OF MANAGEMENT OF SHRI SHANKARACHARYA INTER COLLEGE Vs. DISTRICT INSPECTOR OF SCHOOLS SULTANPUR

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS petition is by a Committee of Management of an Intermediate College. It terminated the services of a teacher without obtaining the prior approval of the DIOS as required by Section 16-G (3) (a) of the Intermediate Education Act, 1921. Thereupon the DIOS has directed the Institution to submit the pay bill of employees of the institution after including the salary of opposite-party no. 2 because in his opinion the termination of the services of opposite-party no. 2 was void. On behalf of the petitioner it has been urged by learned Counsel, Sri S. L. Varma, that the matter is governed by a decision of a Division Bench of this Court in City Montessory Schools v. DIOS, 1983 AWC 614, to which one of us was a party. In that case the Institution concerned was not an aided Institution and the U. P. High Schools and Intermediate Colleges (Payment of Salaries of Teachers and other Employees) Act, 1971 was hot attracted and the implications of that Act (for short, the Payment of Salaries Act), were not considered. In deed, no occasion arose in that case for considering the implications of the Payment of Salaries Act or the powers of the DIOS under that Act. The services of the teachers of unaided institutions had been terminated by the Management and the DIOS in that case had passed orders declaring the termination orders to be invalid and directing the Management to reinstate the teachers. It was held by the Bench that the DIOS had no powers either to make a bare declaration or to direct reinstatement of services of teachers even if the termination may be void by virtue of the provisions of section 16-G (3) (a). In the instant case the DIOS has, no doubt, observed that the termination was void, but this has been observed merely as a ground for passing the substantive order. The substantive order is for including the name of the teacher in the salary bill under the Payment of Salaries Act. That the termination sought to be effected by the Management without obtaining prior approval of the DIOS is bad in law has been held in a series of decisions of this Court. Those decisions were not departed from in the City Montessory Schools' Case (supra). If the order of termination was void, then it was open to the DIOS to exercise powers under the Payment of Salaries Act, under sections 10 of which the State Government is liable for payment of salaries of teachers of every institution. It is the bounden duty of the State Government to pay salaries of teachers and other employees. When the State Government or the DIOS finds that the services of a teacher have been sought to be terminated by an order which is void and as such non-est, the DIOS cannot abdicate his responsibility for payment of salary of such a teacher. There is nothing in the decision in the City Montessory Schools (supra) which may preclude the DIOS from taking note of the fact that the termination of services sought to be effected and void and on taking note of that fact to pass further consequential orders for which power has been given to him under the Payment of Salaries Act. In this view of the matter, we find no merit in the petition.

(2.) HOWEVER, learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that two other petitions of a similar nature have been admitted by another Bench of this Court to which one of us was a party. They are Writ Petitions Nos. 4777 of 1983 and 5191 of 1983. It is true that these petitions were admitted, but the petitions have not yet been decided. It is not clear whether the implications of the Payment of Salaries Act as noticed above were brought to the notice of the Bench at the time of admission of those petitions. In this view of the matter, the mere fact that the said two petitions have been admitted does not entitle the petitioner to an order of admission of this petition when we find on merits that the petition is not sustainable. A non-speaking order of admission, like a non-speaking order of dismissal of a petition in limine, can hardly avail as a precedent. It has been held by a Division Bench of this Court in Rakesh Kumar Tewari v. Public Service Commission. 1982 Allahabad Weekly Cases 724, that earlier admission of similar petitions has no binding effect and a subsequent petition can nevertheless be dismissed on merits at the admission stage.