RADHEY SHYAM BHARGAVA Vs. DR. BIHARI LAL GUPTA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This appeal has been filed against an order dated 7.9.1978 passed by Judge, Small Cause Court, Moradabad, directing the plaintiff appellant to pay additional court fees on Rs. 85.000.00. In other words, the appellant had been directed to make good the deficiency. It is thus an appeal under-Sec. 6-A of the U.P. Court Fees Act.

(2.) Admittedly, an agreement was entered into between the parties for conveyance of certain immovable property for a sum of Rs. 85,000.00. It was alleged in the plaint that the entire land belonged to the plaintiff appellant and his brother and he had entered into an agreement on behalf of his brother as well, but subsequent to the execution of the agreement, the brother had disposed of his half share of the immovable property. The plaintiff-appellant, therefore, valued the suit at Rs. 42,500.00 and chose today court fees thereon. An objection was taken by the defendant-respondent that proper court fees had not been paid and the appellant was liable to pay court fees not on Rs. 42,500.00 but on the entire sum which formed the subject matter of the agreement viz., Rs. 85,000.00. An issue was struck on the point and the learned Judge, Small Cause Court by his decision held that there was deficiency in court fees and the appellant was liable to pay court, fees on Rs. 85,000.00.

(3.) Learned counsel for the appellant contended that in effect there were two agreements, one with the appellant and another with his brother and therefore the appellant could enforce his rights under the agreement with him. And as such he was liable to pay court-fees only on the valuation of the property which was now in dispute. This contention is not acceptable to us. Undoubtedly the agreement in this case was for the transfer of specific area of Bhumidhari property valued at Rs. 85,000.00. No assertion seems to have been made that there were two separate agreement viz.. between the defendant and the plaintiff and one with plaintiff's brother. The evidence on the record shows that only one agreement was executed between the parties and further that the brother of the appellant had not executed any agreement. Then there was a change of stance and it was urged that the appellant was acting on behalf of his brother. In this view of the matter it is evident that there was only one agreement with the defendant. Thus, the contention to the contrary by the counsel for the plaintiff is without substance.