BINDA PRASAD Vs. IIIRD ADDITIONAL DISTRICT JUDGE FAIZABAD

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS is a tenant's writ petition directed against the order of eviction passed on an application of landlady, opposite party No. 3, under Section 21 (1) (b) of U. P. Act No. 13 of 1972. The Prescribed Authority, and on appeal the learned Additional District Judge, held have that the building was in a dilapidated condition and required to be demolished and that the other requirements of Rule 17 of the Rules made under the Act were also satisfied in the case. As such the petitioner has lost in both the courts below.

(2.) WHEN the petition was presented before Hon'ble D. N. Jha, J. it was admitted and at the same time it was directed that in view of conflicting authorities, the matter shall be listed for hearing before a Division Bench at an early date. The conflicting authorities referred to in the order dated 19-10-1983 were on the question whether the fourth proviso to Section 21 (1) was applicable to an application under Section 21 (1) (b) as well or was it confined only to applications under Section 21 (1) (a). It is in these circumstances that the petition has come up before us for hearing.

(3.) LEARNED counsel has further contended that according to the well known principles of statutory construction where the language of a provision is clear, the question of its reasonableness should not be considered and the Court should not try to supply any omissions, which, according to it, have been inadvertently left uncovered by the legislature or to correct any assumed mistakes therein. It is, however, well settled that every provision of a statute must be interpreted in the light of the context and also in the light of its legislative history. The principle of contextual interpretation is well settled. The question involved in the present case is whether there should be any comparison of hardships in a case where the landlord approaches the Prescribed Authority with an application not on the ground of the building being required for his occupation, but on the ground that the building is in a dilapidated condition, and, as such, it is required for demolition and reconstruction. Where the landlord is not required to prove his need at all, there can be no question of any "hardship" to him by rejection of his application. The contention of the learned counsel that "need" and "hardship" are different concepts, cannot be accepted in the form put forward before us. Of course, it is true that even though the landlord may prove his need, the Court must further consider whether on balance of hardships his prayer for eviction should be granted. In other words, the question in such cases arises whether the need of the landlord, though genuine, is more pressing than the need of the tenant. It cannot, thus, be said that need and hardship are totally independent of each other. The considerations of need and hardship can, it is quite obvious, apply only in respect of applications under clause (a) and not in respect of applications under clause (b), which are based only on the ground of the condition of the building. The need to demolish dilapidated buildings is a social necessity. It is not in the interest of the society itself that dilapidated buildings should be allowed to continue and endanger life and safety, not only of the inmates, but also of persons who may visit the building or may pass along the thoroughfare adjoining the building. The question of importing the comparison of hardships on an application under clause (b) cannot possibly arise, considering the context and also the legislative history as noticed by brother A. N. Varma, J. in Bhola Shanker's case (supra). We are clearly of the opinion that the Fourth proviso was intended to cover only cases which were dealt with by Rule 16 and not to cases which were covered by Rule 17. A perusal of the two rules clearly shows that Rule 16 is related to applications under clause (a) while Rule 17 is related to applications under clause (b). In the circumstances, the further contention of the learned counsel that in case two views be possible, the interpretation favouring the tenant should be preferred, does not arise for consideration. We are clearly of the view that there is only one view possible, namely, that the Fourth proviso cannot apply to applications under clause (b). Accordingly the decision in Jagannath Prasad (supra) to the extent it suggests that the said proviso would apply even to applications under clause (b), cannot be considered to be good law and it is accordingly over-ruled.