AGARWAL DIGAMBAR JAIN SAMITI Vs. BADRI PRASAD SRIVASTAVA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS appeal is directed against the judgment and decree of the Civil Judge, Agra, dated December 23, 1969. The appellant is a Society registered under the Societies Registration Act. An institution known as the M.D. Jain Higher Secondary School, Agra, belongs to it and is managed through its Committee of Management. The respondent was employed in this institution as a trained graduate teacher on July 12, 1949 on temporary basis. He was confirmed on July 1, 1950. From about the year (sic) he was officiating as the Principal. On March 21, 1961, the Committee of Management resolved to place him under suspension. A charge -sheet under the signature of the Manager dated April 16, 1961 was served upon the respondent on April 19, 1961. An additional charge -sheet was also served subsequently on September 15, 1961. In the meanwhile, however, the Committee of Management took decision on June 26, 1961 to terminate the services of the respondent. The Manager wrote to the District Inspector of Schools, Agra on June 30, 1961 to accord permission for terminating the services of the respondent. The respondent was not allowed to join his duties, nor was he paid the salary. He brought the suit on February 1, 1967, giving rise to this appeal, seeking the relief of declaration to the effect that the plaintiff's services not been determined and he continued to be in the service of the defendant. In the alternative, declaration has been sought to the effect that the impugned order of termination of the services of the plaintiff dated June 26, 1961 is illegal and ultra vires and the plaintiff continued to be in the service of the defendant. He has also claimed a sum of Rs. 20,642.11 being the arrears of his pay and D.A. for the period of February (sic), 1961 to January 31, 1967.

(2.) THE suit was resisted by the defendant pleading that contract of personal service of the plaintiff could not be specifically enforced and its termination did not require prior sanction of any person except that of the employer. It was refuted thus that the order of termination impugned in this case was bad on account of the previous permission of the District Inspector of Schools being not obtained as contended by the plaintiff. The services of the plaintiff were duly determined and it was wrong also to say that the plaintiff became aware of the order dated June 26, 1961 for the first time on February 1,1964, as alleged by him. The suit in respect of the amount claimed by the plaintiff was stated to be moreover barred by limitation.

(3.) AGGRIEVED , the defendant has preferred this appeal.