TAJUDDIN Vs. SUB DIVISIONAL OFFICER KHATIMA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) AGGRIEVED by his removal under section 95-G of U. P. Panchayat Raj Act (hereinafter referred to as Act) the petitioner has invoked extra-ordinary jurisdiction of this Court. The Prescribed Authority found that as petitioner had committed irregularities even before assuming the office of Pradhan it amounted to abuse of his position as such within meaning of subclause (e) of sub-Sec. (1) of Section 95-G of the Act. Apart from this petitioner was found to have been convicted under section 323/149 IPC. It was also held that he was accused in Section 25 Arms Act and was guilty of illegally allotting land which was old graveyard. In appeal the claim of petitioner that he could not have been removed for his conviction under sections 323/149 IPC or for accusation under section 25 of Indian Arms Act or for illegal distribution of land as apart from it being incorrect it never was subject matter of charge and he was never afforded any opportunity of hearing was not accepted because the order was passed after giving show cause notice to petitioner. The appellate authority further' found that petitioner started abusing his position even before he assumed the office of Pradhan.

(2.) REMOVAL of Pradhan under section 95-G (1) (e) is contemplated if a Pradhan abuses his position as such or has persistently failed to perform the duties imposed by the Act or rules made thereunder and his continuance as such was not desireable in public interest. The word, 'as such' is significant. In the context in which it has been used it obviously means in the capacity of Pradhan. No action could have been taken under section 95-G of the Act against petitioner under sub-clause (e) for actions which he did not do as Pradhan. It may be that after petitioner was elected as Pradhan in April, 1982 and before be took oath of office in August, 1982 as required under section 12-E his recommendations were given weight but that did not amount to petitioner's abusing his position. It has not been disbelieved that he did not use seal of his office and whatever he did was only as a respectable citizen of the State. Even assuming against petitioner none of the charges for which explanation was called either individually or collectively could result in a finding that petitioner was not fit to continue in office of Pradhan.

(3.) LEARNED counsel for opposite party relied on sub-clause (2) of Clause (g) of Section 95 and urged that petitioner having been accused or charged for an offence involving moral turpitude the order removing from Pradhanship should not be interfered with by this court. LEARNED Counsel argued that acquittal of petitioner for the offence committed under section 323/149 IPC did not make any difference in law as the requirement of law is not that he should have been convicted but mere accusation or charge was sufficient to remove a person from the office of Pradhan. The argument cannot be accepted for two reasons, one as stated earlier this was never the charge framed against petitioner. Second, if a person has been acquitted of an offence involving moral turpitude from the competent court of law then it amounts to bringing an end to the accusation against him from the date the charge was framed against him. If the argument of the learned counsel is accepted that mere accusation is sufficient for removal then it shall lead to abuse.