MAQSOODUL HAQ Vs. STATE OF U P

JUDGEMENT

(1.) AGGRIEVED against an order of allot ment of the accommodation question dated December 2, 1970, the appellant filed an objection on the ground that the house was not vacant. He was living in it with his family. The Rent Control and Eviction Officer rejected this objection on the finding that the appellant was living at Hyderabad and the allottee of the house in ques tion had migrated to Pakistan and so the house was vacant and available for allotment. The State Government affirmed this order and dismissed the revision filed by the appellant under Section 7-F of the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947.

(2.) THEREAFTER the appellant filed a writ petition in this court. That also failed, leading to the present appeal.

(3.) IT was next contended that the order of allotment was not en forceable because the 1947 Act was repealed by the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulations of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972, which came into force on July 15, 1972. Section 43 of the 1972 Act provides for repeal and savings. Sub-section (1) thereof repeals the 1947 Act, and sub-section (2) provides in many clauses for various situations which are to operate not with standing the repeal. Clause (t) provides that any decision of the district Magistrate, the Pres cribed Authority, the district Judge, the commissioner or the State Government under the foregoing clauses may be enforced, whenever necessary, in like manner as if it were an order by a competent au thority under the corresponding provisions of this Act. Clause (k) of Section 43 (2) provides that an order passed by the District Magistrate before the commencement of this Act under Section (2) or under Section 7-A shall become final if it was passed more than thirty days before the commencement of this Act. The question is, what is the correct significance of the phrase 'any decision of the district Magistrate ...... under the foregoing clause's occur ring in clause (t). A decision can be under the foregoing clauses if it is empowered to be made by any of the foregoing clauses. For instance clause (k) (2) provides for an appeal to the district Judge against an order passed under Section 7 (2) of Section 7-A of the old Act, made not more than thirty days before the commencement of the 1972 Act. It can be said that clause k(2) authorises the district Judge to make a decision in appeal. Clause k(2), however, makes an order passed by the district Magistrate under Section 7(2) or Sec tion 7-A made more than thirty days before the commencement of this Act, final. The old Act was a temporary Act. With its repeal all orders passed and proceedings taken, under that Act would have lapsed. To save such orders clause (k) (1) makes the mentioned or ders Final. It has the efficacy of making those orders operative and enforceable. Clause (t) is a machinery provision which makes the orders mentioned in it executable as if they were passed by the com petent authority under the corresponding provision of this Act. Clause (t) provides for the method of execution of the orders made under, or recognised by the foregoing clauses of this section as en forceable. An order which is recognised by clause (k) (1) as having become final, that is executable, would, in our opinion, be a decision under clause (k) (1), within meaning of clause (t) and it may be en forced in the manner provided by that clause.