KAILASH CHANDRA Vs. OM PRAKASH SHARMA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS is a tenant's ap plication under Article 226 of the Constitution praying for a writ of certiorari quashing the order of the State Gov ernment dated 24-11-1971 (Annexure 6 of the writ petition) passed under Section 7-F of the U. P. (Temporary) Control of Rent & Eviction Act (hereinafter refer red to as the Act).

(2.) THE short facts of the case are that respondent No. 1 namely, Om Pra kash Sharma is the landlord of house No. 76, Mohalla Baba Khaki in the city of Meerut. The petitioners are tenants of the said respondent and have been occupying the entire accommodation as tenants for a considerable period. In fact, the house was purchased by respondent No. 1 on 8-2-1971 and the accommodation in dis pute had been in the tenancy of the peti tioners since before the transfer of the house. On 30-3-1971 respondent No. 1 made an application under Section 3 of the Act for permission to sue the peti tioners for ejectment. The permission was granted by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer by his order dated 22-5- 1971 (Annexure 4 of the writ petition). The petitioners filed a revision which was allowed by the Commissioner, Meerut Division by his order dated 6-7-1971 (Annexure 5 of the writ petition). There after respondent No. 1 preferred a repre sentation under Section 7-F of the Act and the State Government by its im pugned order dated 24-11-1971 (Annexure 6 of the writ petition) set aside the order of the Commissioner and restored that of the Rent Control and Eviction Officer. Thus, the permission initially accorded to respondent No. 1 for filing a suit for ejectment against the petitioners was eventually affirmed by the State Govern ment.

(3.) IT is an elementary principle which must be borne in mind in exercis ing jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution that the Court should not interfere on mere technicalities or on account of some slight omission which may be attributed to an intelligent form of the order but which has not really occasioned a failure of justice. If the overall impression created after scrutiny of the various impugned orders is that all the relevant aspects of the case were taken into consideration by the authority concerned and it did apply its mind to the material features of the case, then it is not open to the petitioner to resort to some set formula in order to get rid of an order which is not to his advantage. I am not prepared to accept the contention of the petitioners that the State Govern ment's order in the instant case w.as pass ed without applying its mind to all the salient features of the case or that it was based on one-sided view of the mat ter and completely ignored the point of view of the tenant. There are different ways of recording one's conclusions and whereas it is desirable that while dis senting from the order of the immediate subordinate authority reasons for the same must be set out, it is not the re quirement of law that for affirming the order of the next lower authority in the hierarchy, reasons must also be set out in as much detail and as exhaustively. There can be no legal flaw in the order of the highest authority if it fully points out the fallacy in the contrary order of the immediate lower authority and then substantially adopts the order passed by the first authority without going into minute details in support of the same. As I have already observed, the ultimate im pression formed by a perusal of the last order in the present case is that the State Government was alive to the needs of the landlord and the tenants and that no consideration germane to the controversy between the parties was omitted. As such the order does not suffer from any legal' infirmity