NARENDRA KUMAR JAIN Vs. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THE petitioner is the tenant of shop No. 946 in Chowk Bazar, Sarak Tahsil Deoband. He is carrying on business of general merchandise, chemist and druggist. The fourth respondent, Prem Chand Jain, is the landlord. He moved an application under Section 3 of the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947, for permission to file a suit against the petitioner on the ground that he needed the shop for his own personal use. It may be stated that the landlord is employed in Sugar Mills, Deoband and he wanted to start a business to augment his income. The application was al lowed by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer. On appeal, however, the order of the Rent Control and Eviction Officer was set aside by the Commissioner, Meerut Division, Meerut, the respondent No. 2. The landlord then approached the State Government under Sec tion 7-F and the State Government by its order dated December 9, 1971 has set aside the order of the Commissioner and has granted the permission to the landlord. The petitioner has now approached this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution.

(2.) THAT the landlord needs the accommodation in dispute for his personal use cannot be disputed. The State Government has given a finding in this regard that being a finding of fact has to be accepted. It has been repeatedly held by this court that a landlord cannot succeed merely by showing that his need is genuine and bona fide. The need of the tenant has also to be considered and the permission can be granted to a landlord only if the need of the landlord is greater than that of the tenant. In other words what has to be seen is as to what is the likely hardship which would be caused to the tenant, if he is ejected, and the hardship of the landlord, in case his request for evicting the tenant is refused. The petitioner's allegation that the landlord wants to evict him because he wants to increase the rent cannot be accepted. The finding now is that the present income of the landlord is meagre and he wants to augment it by starting a business. On the other hand, so far as the tenant is concerned, the finding recorded by the State Government is that he has been carry ing on the business since long. According to the finding of the Com missioner, the petitioner has been carrying on the business in the disputed accommodation for the last 35 years. The State Govern ment has also recorded a finding that the petitioner has no other shop in Deoband. Therefore, the hardship that would be caused to the petitioner obviously would be that he would lose his business, be cause he has no alternative accommodation where to shift his busi ness. The Rent Control and Eviction Officer, no doubt, was of the opinion that the petitioner could shift his business to the upper storey (Balakhana) of his house, or he could convert the court-yard attach ed to his house for the purpose of a shop. These findings apparently have not been accepted by the State Government which has recorded a finding that the petitioner has no other shop in Deoband. The other finding that the petitioner has been carrying on business in the disputed shop for the last 35 years impliedly means that the peti tioner must have acquired some good- will. It is a matter of common knowledge that the type of business that the petitioner is carrying on depends largely on the good-will acquired by a business house. The State Government, no doubt, has stated in its order that it has compared the needs of the landlord and the tenant and has come to the conclusion that the need of the landlord is genuine and more pressing. But, I am of opinion, that this finding is clearly perverse. On the one hand the landlord merely wants to set up a business in order to augment his income. On the other hand, the petitioner will be completely out of business because he has no alternative shop where he can set it up; nor has it been held that with reasonable efforts the petitioner can acquire an alternative accommodation. With these facts no reasonable man would come to the conclusion that the need of the landlord is greater than that of the tenant.

(3.) THE petition is accordingly allowed. The order of the State Government dated December 9, 1971 is quashed. The petitioner is entitled to the costs.