SUKHRAJ AND ANOTHER Vs. RAMNATH AND OTHERS

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS is an appeal from a judgment of our brother G.C. Mathur, refusing to quash by certiorari an order passed by a Deputy Director, refusing to revise an order passed by a Settlement Officer, dismissing an appeal preferred Under Section 21(2) of the Consolidation of Holdings Act, as barred by time. Respondent No. 4 filed an objection against a statement of proposals as permitted by Section 20 and it was disposed of by a Consolidation Officer on 24 -1 -1963. The Appellants were not cited as parties to the objection, no notice was given to them and they were not heard before it was disposed of. The order passed by the Consolidation Officer is not very intelligible, but it has not been interpreted to involve an alteration in the chak of the Appellants. Section 21(1) lays down:

(2.) THE Appellants applied to the Deputy Director to revise the Settlement Officer's order. One contention advanced before him was that even if the appeal could not be entertained by the Settlement Officer by virtue of the provisions of Section 22, he could entertain it by virtue of the provisions of Sections 22 and 53 -B read with Section 5 of the Limitation Act. The Deputy Director rejected this contention holding that even under Section 5 of the Limitation Act the appeal could not be entertained after the confirmation of the statement of proposals under Section 23. For this he relied upon the proviso contained in Section 22(3) that no appeal filed after the expiry of the period of limitation could be entertained on the ground of material injustice caused by the order appealed from after the confirmation of the statement of proposals. It does not appear to have been contended before him that Section 53 -B gives an additional right to a Settlement Officer to entertain a time -barred appeal and is not subject to the proviso contained in Section 22(3)(ii) and that there was sufficient cause within the meaning of Section 5 of the Limitation Act because of the fact that the revised extract from the statement of proposals had been served upon the Appellants only four days before they filed the appeal. He dismissed the revision application and the Appellants applied for certiorari for the quashing of his and the Settlement Officer's orders. Our learned brother refused certiorari because he saw no error in the orders. He endorsed the view of the Deputy Director that even if the appeal was governed by Section 53 -B it could not be entertained on account of the provisions of Section 22(3)(ii).

(3.) THE Appellants pleaded before us, in the alternative, that their appeal was not barred by time at all. Their contention was that on account of the provisions contained in Sub -rule (1) of Rule 49, the objection must be deemed to have been disposed of by the Consolidation Officer on 16.4.1963, the date on which the revised extract was served upon them. It is not understood why the Government provided the legal fiction in Sub -rule (2) that an objection shall not be deemed to be disposed of until the revised extract has been served on the tenure holders concerned. The only reference to the disposal of an objection is in Section 21(1), laying down that the Consolidation Officer "shall dispose of the same...." and Sub -rule (1) of Rule 49 to the effect that the Consolidation Officer should visit the village "for the disposal of the objections." The legal fiction was certainly not needed for the purpose of extending the meaning of the word "disposal" in either of these two provisions. There was no scope for extending the meaning of the word "disposed" used in Section 21(1) and nothing was to be gained by giving it the extended meaning. An objection can be disposed of only in two ways: (1) by rejection and (2) by being allowed and by altering the statement of proposals. It is only after an objection has been disposed of that the question would arise of serving upon the tenure holders concerned a notice rejecting the objection or a revised extract from the statement of proposals. It is impossible to say that an objection is disposed of, that a notice rejecting it or a revised extract from the statement of proposals is served upon the tenure holders and that the objection is deemed to be disposed of when it is done. It is meaningless to say that an act is deemed to be done when something required to be done after it has been done, is done. In any case, no useful purpose was to be served by the Government's giving the word "disposed'' used in Section 21(1) an extended meaning. Similarly, nothing was to be gained by giving the word "disposal" used in Sub -rule (1) such an extended meaning. Clearly, "disposal" there means decision of the objection either by rejecting it or by amending the statement of proposals. The Consolidation Officer did not have to visit the village just for serving upon the tenure holders a notice rejecting the objection or a revised extract from the statement of proposals. Moreover, a Consolidation Officer who visited the village after deciding the objection, but before the date of service of the notice of rejection or a revised extract, could not be deemed to have visited the village for the disposal of the objection. It could not have been the intention of the Government to give such an absurd meaning to the provision contained in Sub -rule (1) by enacting the legal fiction. When the phrase "disposed of" has not been used in any other provision, the legal fiction enacted in Sub -rule (2) does not serve any useful purpose.