RAM NARAIN SINGH Vs. BATUK BHAIRON PANDEY

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS is a Defendant's appeal arising out of a suit for the recovery of Rs. 1762/10/9. It was alleged by the Plaintiff that his father advanced to the Defendant a loan of Rs. 400/ - on 21st December, 1950 and another loan of Rs. 499/12/ - on 10th December 1952. It was said that on 11th June 1953 the Defendant acknowledged in writing that a sum of Rs. 637/8/ - was due from him under the first loan and a sum of Rs. 660/ - under the 2nd. The suit was filed on 2nd June 1956. The defence was a denial of the loan and also of the fact that the acknowledgement relied upon by the Plaintiff was in the writing of the Defendant. It was also pleaded that the acknowledgment was unstamped and was, therefore, inadmissible in evidence. The trial court dismissed the suit with the findings that no loan had been advanced by the Plaintiff's father to the Defendant nor had the Defendant acknowledged that any sum was due from him. The acknowledgment of 11th Jane 1953 was also held by the trial court as inadmissible in evidence. The Plaintiff preferred an appeal against the dismissal of his suit by the trial court and the lower appellate court allowed the appeal, reversed the decision of the trial court and decreed the suit. The lower appellate court found that the two loans alleged by the Plaintiff had really been advanced to the Defendant, that the acknowledgment relied upon by the Plaintiff was in the writing of the Defendant, and that it was admissible in evidence. The Defendant has come in appeal to this Court.

(2.) THE only question raised before me by Mr. K.M. Dayal, learned Counsel for the Defendant -Appellant, is that as the acknowledgment in question was not stamped it was inadmissible in evidence. The point to be considered is whether Section 36 of the Stamp Act now precludes the Appellant from questioning the admissibility of the acknowledgment.

(3.) SECTION 36 of the Stamp Act is not limited in its application to those cases only in which an instrument has been admitted in evidence by the trial court. The words used in the section are very wide in their scope and they do not limit its application to cases in which an instrument is accepted in evidence by the trial court. The admission in evidence of an instrument by an appellate court is as much a bar to a subsequent objection to its admissibility as its admission in evidence by the trial court. I may here refer to Ramasami Ghetti v. Ratnasami Ghetti and another [1] (ILR 5 Mad 220) and Brij Raj Saran and Anr. v. Joti Parshad [2] (AIR 1923 Lah 657).