DEVI PRASAD Vs. STATE

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THESE are three appeals by the twenty two convicted out of thirty accused persons many of whom were tried upon a number of charges all joined together as they were in respect of offences alleged to have been committed in the course of one vast conspiracy. The object of the conspiracy was said to have been to obtain cement and iron by means of forged permits in favour of fictitious and non-existent individuals and to use these controlled goods for the purposes of black marketing and also for adulteration of cement, by mixture with sand and earth, and its sale as good and genuine cement. Originally, there were thirty one accused persons, but one Nathmal (P. W. 275) was permitted to become an approver and given a conditional pardon so that he may reveal the inner workings of the conspiracy which was said to have been unearthed due to the information given and efforts made by Sri Pannalal Trivedi who came forward, as a public spirited citizen, with an application (Ex Ka-1) which was received in the office of Sri Sarnpurnanand, the then Chief Minister of Uttar Pradesh, on 26th September 1955, containing allegations which Sri Trivedi had already made orally to the Chief Minister. It was forwarded on to the Senior Superintendent of Police, Varanasi, on 4-10-1955, and then investigations started. The period covered by the charges for the alleged conspiracy is from 1-11-54 to 31-3-56.

(2.) THE learned Civil and Sessions Judge of Varanasi who heard this case, continuously for more than a year, examined exactly three hundred witnesses, whose evidence covered nearly 3000 pages, and 4989 documents were taken in evidence to prove the charges against the appellants. The learned Judge disposed of the case by means of a very elaborate but lucid judgment of 350 pages with a very neatly arranged index giving various headings under which the evidence and the contentions have been marshalled and dealt with. The length of the judgment does not diminish the clarity which results from the commendable systematic arrangement and treatment of all items of evidence and of the contentions advanced. Nevertheless, there is a danger in such a case that the evidence may be rather mechanically weighed and stamped as acceptable or unacceptable by applying much too simple tests. Such a danger of over simplification can only be met by a close scrutiny of all the evidence against and in favour of each accused and a thorough and careful consideration of the case of each accused individually. I have, therefore, carefully considered the case of each accused-appellant again. The whole evidence was re-examined and reassessed by me and the whole long judgment of the trial court was read before me. Parts of the evidence and the judgment were gone over several times before me during a hearing of nearly a month and a half. I will, however, deal only with questions which I consider material and significant in reassessing the evidence against each appellant.

(3.) THE first objection taken on behalf of the appellants is that there was a misjoinder of accused persons and of charges in respect or separate transactions which has resulted in prejudice and injustice to the appellants who were so confused by the multiplicity of charges and profusion of evidence that they could not meet each of them separately properly. In a case of conspiracy, it is not necessary for the validity of a trial to ultimately prove that the conspiracy alleged actually existed. The validity of a joint trial upon charges for offences alleged to be parts of the conspiracy is determined by the initial accusations levelled by the prosecution against the whole body of accused persons (vide K. Kunhammad v. State of Madras, AIR 1960 SC 661 relying upon Babu Lal v. Emperor, AIR 1938 PC 130 ). In this case, there is an accusation of conspiracy against each accused person which enables the case to pass the initial test of a valid joinder of a number of charges and of accused persons. Moreover, 1 find that charges were preferred first of all, against seven accused persons, namely, Bhagwati Prasad, and Banarsi, and Parma Lal, and Debi Prasad, and Lalli Prasad, and Munni Lal, and Chhedi Lal. But, these seven accused persons, who are amongst the appellants, objected to a separate trial and wanted a joint trial with all the other accused persons against whom the cases were still under investigation. The matter came up to this Court in revision at the instance of the accused persons, and this court ordered a joint trial. No accused person complained at any earlier stage of any prejudice resulting from a joinder of charges or of accused persons, and, in any case, in view of the legal position stated above, there can be no legally valid objection to the joinder of charges and of accused persons. 1, therefore, reject this initial objection which was taken but not seriously pressed before me. The only course open to a Court in such a case is, as I have already indicated, to scrutinize the case of each accused person with special care so as to guard against lurking possibilities of prejudice and injustice from multiplicity of charges to accused persons.