RAMESHWAR PRASAD Vs. MST. RAM PIARI AND ANOTHER

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This is an execution second appeal against the order of the Civil Judge of Gonda.

(2.) The applicant's wife and daughter sued him for maintenance on the 31st August, 1943. They claimed Rs. 2700/ - as arrears of maintenance and future maintenance at the rate of Rs. 900/ - per year. The suit was resisted and the trial Court granted a decree for Rs. 1018/ - on account of arrears of maintenance and also a decree for Rs. 30/ - per mensem for future maintenance. The applicant went in appeal and a cross objection was also filed by the Plaintiff. The appellate Court allowed the appeal partly as also the cross -objection. The decree was modified and the arrears of maintenance were reduced to Rs. 560/ - and future maintenance was increased to Rs. 35/ - per mensem. After the decree had become final the decree -holders applied for the execution of their decree on the 7th March, 1949. They claimed arrears of maintenance decree by the appellate Court as also maintenance for the period from 19th May, 1945, to 7th March, 1946. The Appellant raised certain objections in execution but they are not all material for the decision of this appeal. One of the objections, however, raised by the Appellant was that the application for execution in respect of the maintenance for the period 19th May, 1945, to 7th March, 1946, was barred by limitation inasmuch as the application for execution was made on the 7th March, 1949. But the Courts below repelled this contention of the Appellant and held that limitation for making an application for execution would run from the date of the final decree, and as the final decree was passed on the 7th March, 1946, and the execution application was made on the 7th March, 1949, it was within time. It is not disputed that the execution application in this case was made on the last day of limitation, namely, the 7th March, 1949.

(3.) It is contended on behalf of the Appellant that the decree -holder's right to execute the decree had not been suspended during the pendency of the appeal, and if the application for execution is in respect of any amount which accrued due on account of maintenance more than three years before the date of the application for execution, it should be held to be barred. Learned Counsel for the Respondent, on the other hand, contends that time begins to run only from the date of the final decree under Article 182(2) of the Limitation Act. It appears to me that the contention raised by the learned Counsel for the Appellant is not sound. If it takes more than three years for a Court to decide the amount which may be decreed, in appeal, the decree in respect of certain sums would become barred by time even before the decree in appeal is passed. This could not be the intention of the Legislature. It is clearly mentioned in Column 3 of Article 182 of the Limitation Act that the date from which the period of limitation would begin to run would be the date of the final decree if there has been an appeal. The appeal was decided on the 7th March, 1946, and any application for execution in respect of the decree passed or confirmed in appeal would be within time if presented within three years of the date of the appellate decree. There is thus no force in this appeal and the view taken by the appellate Court appears to be correct. The appeal is dismissed with costs to the Respondent.