(1.) This special appeal arises from a judgment of a learned Single Judge dated 13 September 2013, dismissing a petition which was filed by the appellant under Article 226 of the Constitution.
(2.) The appellant was appointed on 6 January 2003 on the recommendation of the General Selection Committee by the Vice Chancellor of the Aligarh Muslim University as Principal in the S.T.S. High School on probation for a period of one year with effect from the date he joined duty. The order of the Vice Chancellor was passed in exercise of powers conferred by Section 19 (3) of the Aligarh Muslim University Act, 1920 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). The period of probation was extended on 30 April 2004 for a further period of six months with effect from 5 May 2004. This was in view of the fact that the appellant had actually joined as Principal on 5 May 2003 and the probation was to expire on 4 May 2004. The extended period of probation was to come to an end on 4 November 2004. On 4 November 2004, a communication was addressed to the appellant by the Registrar of the University stating that the Vice Chancellor in exercise of the powers vested in him under Section 19 (3) of the Act had ordered that the services of the appellant should be dispensed with. The appellant challenged the order dated 4 November 2004 in the writ proceedings before the learned Single Judge. By the impugned order dated 13 September 2013, the petition has been dismissed.
(3.) The learned Single Judge has observed that no interim order had enured to the benefit of the appellant during the pendency of the proceedings and though the appellant could file an appeal before the Executive Council of the University under Section 19 (3) of the Act, the appellant had not, within the stipulated period of three months or even thereafter, exhausted the alternative remedy. In the circumstances, the learned Single Judge was of the view that the petition had been rendered infructuous and no further order or direction was required to be issued. It may also be noted that in the course of recording the submission of the appellant, the learned Single Judge observed that the appellant had already retired from service after attaining the age of superannuation.