MAHESH CHANDRA SHARMA Vs. STATE OF U P

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The present criminal revision has been filed seeking quashing of the order dated 8.10.2013 passed by learned Addl. District and Sessions Judge, Court No. 13, Aligarh whereby an application moved under section 319 Cr.P.C. in S.T. No. 131 of 2011 State v. Gagan Sharma and others under sections 498A, 302 and 304B IPC and section 3/4, D.P. Act has been rejected. Heard learned Counsel for the revisionist and learned AGA for the State. The entire record including impugned order has been perused.

(2.) The contention of the Counsel is that the statements of the prosecution witnesses who have been examined to prove the factual aspects of the case clearly disclose the complicity of both the respondents, namely, Munna Lal alias Murari Lal Sharma and Ram Kumar Upadhyay respectively and it cannot be said that there was no evidence on record on the basis, of which they could to have been summoned by the Lower Court under section 319 Cr.P.C. According to the Counsel it is very much within the powers of the Court to summon the additional accused other than those who are facing the trial, if the evidence produced discloses certain offences having been committed by them. According to the Counsel though it is a fact that the Investigating Officer after investigating the case did not find it fit to submit the charge-sheet against the twin respondents but the submission of final report or the non-submission of charge sheet against them will not preclude the Court from exercising its power under section 319 Cr.P.C. According to the Counsel the powers under section 319 Cr.P.C. are plenary in nature and can be exercised even against the accused whose complicity was found to be doubtful in the estimate of the Investigating Officer. It has also been submitted that though an earlier application moved by first informant seeking the summoning of the respondents under section 319 Cr.P.C. had been rejected by the Trial Court and revision against the same was also dismissed by the High Court but a subsequent application moved after the production of the new witness shall be maintainable in law and the earlier rejection shall not act as a bar to summon the accused at a later stage of the trial on the basis of the new material. According to the Counsel the impugned order has been passed on the second application moved by first informant after the first had already been rejected but according to the Counsel, the second application was filed after P.W. 2 was produced whose evidence was not available at the time of the earlier rejection. Further submission is that while deciding the application under section 319 Cr.P.C. the Trial Court had not much discretion to exercise and the allegations made by the witnesses ought to have been thought sufficient to summon the accused but the same has not been done. The impugned order is, therefore bad in eyes of law according to the contentions raised by the Counsel.

(3.) Learned AGA in rebuttal has submitted that the impugned order is a reasoned order containing correct analysis of facts and law both and there is nothing wrong that may be pointed out in the impugned order and the same cannot be faulted with.