DOABA ROLLING MILLS P LTD Vs. CEGAT

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This writ petition has been filed for quashing the order of the Customs, Excise and Service Tax Appellate Tribunal, New Delhi, dated 25-8-2003, by which it had dismissed the application of the petitioner, affirming its earlier order dated 4-12-2002 by which it had dismissed the petitioner's appeal against the order of the Adjudicating Authority.

(2.) In the instant case, the appeal was dismissed with the observation that by amendment in the Customs Act, the Appellate Authority did not have the power to condone the delay of more than 30 days and admittedly the appeal had been preferred after expiry of more than 30 days, therefore, the learned Tribunal had rejected the appeal vide order dated 4-12-2002. Subsequently, petitioner preferred an application to recall that order, which has been dismissed by impugned order. Hence this petition.

(3.) If the statute provides for a period of limitation, and further maximum period for which the delay can be condoned, the authority can not extend the same. If the Legislature in its wisdom has fixed a maximum period for doing a particular thing, the authority is not competent to prescribe the period beyond it. Example for the same may be given that the Legislature while amending the Code of Civil Procedure, particularly Section 148, restricted the period which Civil Court may extend to do something only to the extent of 30 days and not beyond it. Earlier there had been no limitation. Similarly, under Order VIII Rule 1, C.P.C. amendment has been made that written statement be filed within thirty days from the date of service of summons but the Court by recording reasons, may extend the said period upto 90 days. Interpreting the said provisions that Civil Court may have a power to extend that period further, would amount to rewriting a provision, which is not permissible in law. Statutory provision has to be read without adding or subtracting any word in it. Statutory provision requires to be given strict adherence.