SARJUDAS Vs. VRINDAVAN

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS is a second appeal under Section 331(4) of the UPZA & LR Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act), preferred against the judgment and decree dated 30-11-1995, passed by the learned Additional Commissioner, Jhansi Division, Jhansi, in appeal No. 61/67 of 1993-94, allowing the same and reversing the judgment and decree dated 25-2-1994/3-3-1994, passed by the learned trial Court in a suit under Section 229-B of the Act.

(2.) BRIEFLY stated, the facts, giving rise to the instant second appeal are that the plaintiff, Vrindavan instituted a suit under Section 229-B of the Act against the defendant, Sarjudas for declaration of his rights as bhumidhar, in possession of the land, in dispute, with transferable rights inter alia pleading that the name of the plaintiff was recorded over the land in dispute in revenue records in place of his father by dint of succession, who died 10-12 years ago and was the original tenant but on plot Nos. 43-A and 44, the name of Gulley was inadvertently recorded after whose death, his son, Sarjudas, defendant claims his rights over these plots and therefore, the cause of action arose for expunging the names of Gulley as well as Sarjudas over these plots. On notice, the defendant contested the suit of the plaintiff, denying the allegations and inter alia pleading that since the plaintiff has no claim whatsoever, his suit is liable to be dismissed. The learned trial Court, after completing the requisite trial, dismissed the suit of the plaintiff, vide his judgment and decree dated 25-2-1994 and as such the plaintiff went up in appeal before the learned Additional Commissioner, who has allowed the same and reversed the judgment and decree, passed by the learned trial Court, vide his judgment and decree, dated 30-11-1995 and therefore, it is against this judgment and decree that the instant second appeal has been filed by Sarjudas before the Board.

(3.) I have closely and carefully considered the arguments, advanced before me by the learned Counsel for the parties and have also scanned the record on file. The suit of the plaintiff has been dismissed by the learned trial Court since in the khatauni 1366-68F, it is recorded that as per the orders of the SDO concerned, the name of Gulley, the father of the defendant is recorded and since no attempt has been made by the plaintiff to prove the same otherwise by adducing positive evidence, his claim falls to the ground. The learned Additional Commissioner, to the contrary, has dealt with the matter in question through and through, analytically and logically and has categorically observed that since the land, in dispute, was recorded in the name of the father of the plaintiff, Halku in 1360-F and the same position finds place in 1366-68F, the entry of the name of Sarjudas after the death of his father, Gulley abruptly appeared in the revenue records without any basis, rhyme or reason, which is itself proved to be illegal and uncalled for. The possession of the plaintiff is also proved to the hilt from the evidence on record and since the entry of the name in CLRD scheme is a summary proceeding in nature, the same has no effect, whatsoever in a regular suit. I am also perfectly convinced with the observation made by the learned Additional Commissioner that in CLRD scheme, the rights and title of any tenure-holder cannot be snatched away for the same reason and therefore, the views, expressed by him, with which I entirely agree, being perfectly in order, does not call for any interference by this Court at this stage. The findings, recorded by him, duly arrived at after due and proper appreciation of evidence on record, are also rather categorical and therefore, I do not find any reason or basis to disturb the same. The contentions of the learned Counsel for the appellant, who has miserably failed to substantiate his claim, too, are rather untenable for the same reason. No substantial question of law is either involved in this second appeal and therefore, I, in the facts and circumstances of the instant case, am fully convinced that this second appeal, having no force, very richly deserves dismissal outright.