TINKU @ GOPAL Vs. STATE OF U.P.

JUDGEMENT

(1.) HEARD Sri Manish Tiwary, learned counsel for the revisionist, Sri O.P. Dubey, Advocate, for the complainant and the learned A.G.A. for the opposite party.

(2.) THIS criminal revision has been directed against the order dated 3-6-2003 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Court No. 25 (Fast Track) Allahabad, whereby his petition for his declaration as juvenile under the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000, (for short the 'Act') on the date of incident was dismissed.

(3.) THE aforesaid reasonings given by the Court below appear to be wholly untenable in law. In the first place it may be pointed out that right from 1984 onwards, the Hon'ble apex Court through its decision given in different cases has repeatedly held that a minor has right to raise his plea that he was such a minor at the time of alleged incident at any stage even during the pendency of the S.L.P. before the said Court. Some of the decisions of the cases are Gopinath Ghosh v. The State of West Bengal, AIR 1984 SC 237 and Umesh Singh and another v. State of Bihar, 2000(2) JIC 451 (SC) : 2000 SCC (Cri) 1026. The learned Addl. Sessions Judge simply taking guidance from the case of Ramdeo Chauhan (supra) should not have recorded his finding at that stage of the case that the accused-applicant was barred from raising his plea of being juvenile and thus not permitting the benefit of provisions of the said Act. In the case of Gopinath Ghosh (supra), the apex Court has been very specific that such a plea could be taken by minor at any stage even before the Supreme Court and if it is found that he happens to be a minor, the benefit of the benevolent provisions of the Act should be extended to him by the Courts. The interpretation of Article 39 Clause (f) of the Constitution of India has also been given by the apex Court in the said judgment and thus has held that it is obligatory for Courts to protect the interest of children as provided under the Act. The Courts have been directed to give opportunities and facilities to the children to develop in a healthy manner. The technicalities should not come in the way of the Courts in extending the protection of the benevolent provisions of such social legislation mainly brought into the existence by the legislature for safeguarding and securing opportunities and facilities to the children to develop in a healthy manner. In case of Ramdeo Chauhan (supra), the apex Court forbade the accused to raise such plea at a juncture when the said case had been finally disposed of by the apex Court itself and before that no such plea was raised. The accused was sentenced to death and only for the purposes to review the death sentence that this plea was raised before the Hon'ble Court at that stage. In such circumstances, the apex Court by a majority decision has found that an accused cannot be permitted to put an afterthought before the Court, which is simply by way of concoction of his imagination at this belated stage to thwart the course of justice and thus, the Court decide that in such circumstances as were available before it, the accused could not be permitted to wrangle the procedure and technicalities of law.