KAILASH NARAIN AGNIHOTRI Vs. STATE OF U P

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The controversy as to whether a person who is working in the Palika Centralised Service and subsequently transferred to the Development Authority can claim a right of absorption was decided by a Division Bench of this Court in Raj Kumar Wadhani v. State of U.P. and Ors., 1994 (24) ALR 331, and the claim of the petitioner therein was rejected. This Court considered the effect and impact of the provisions of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897; the provisions of Sections 5-A and 59 of the Uttar Pradesh Urban Planning and Development Act, 1973 (hereinafter called as the 'Act, 1973'); provisions of the Uttar Pradesh Nagar Mahapalika Adhiniyam, 1959 (hereinafter called as the'Act, 1959'); the provisions of Municipalities Act, 1916 (hereinafter called as the 'Act' 1916), and the Ordinance Nos. 19 of 1984, 10 of 1985 and Act No. 21 of 1985 having bearing on the provisions of Section 5-A of the Act, 1973.

(2.) Another Division Bench while hearing a writ petition placed reliance upon the judgment of a learned single Judge in Narain Ji Gopal v. State of U.P. and Ors., Writ Petition No. 9226 of 1989, decided on 24.4.1992, wherein a similar claim had been allowed and made the reference with an observation that there is a conflict in the two judgments in view of the fact that the State of U.P. v. Narain Ji Gopal and Ors., Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 321 of 1993, was dismissed by Hon'ble the Supreme Court in limine by its order dated 7.1.1993 and so it stood affirmed and approved.

(3.) We have heard Sri V.C. Mishra, learned senior counsel for the petitioner and Sri Sudhir Agrawal, learned Additional Advocate General appearing for the respondent Nos. 1 to 3 and Sri A.K. Mishra, learned counsel for respondent No. 4. The first issue that arises for consideration is whether the dismissal of the Special Leave Petition by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in limine i.e., by a non-speaking order, amounts to affirmation or confirmation or approval of the order impugned before the Supreme Court. On this issue a large number of judgments have been cited including; The Workmen of Cochin Port Trust v. The Board of Trustees of the Cochin Port Trust and Anr., AIR 1978 SC 1283; Ahmedabad Manufacturing and Calico Printing Co. Ltd. v. The Workmen and Anr., AIR 1981 SC 960; Sahu Govind Prasad v. Commissioner of Income Tax, 1983 (144) ITR 851; Late Nawab Sir Mir Osman All Khan v. Commissioner of Wealth Tax, Hyderabad, 1986 (Supp) SCC 700; Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. v. State of Bihar and Ors., AIR 1986 SC 1780; Supreme Court Employees' Welfare Association v. Union of India and Anr., (1989) 4 SCC 187; Rup Diamonds and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors., AIR 1989 SC 674; Supreme Court Employees Welfare Association v. Union of India and Ors., AIR 1990 SC 334; Yogendra Narayan Chowdhury and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors., AIR 1996 SC 751; State of Manipur v. Thingujam Brojen Meetei, (1996) 9 SCC 29; Union of India and Anr. v. Sher Singh and Ors., AIR 1997 SC 1796; Sun Export Corporation, Bombay v. Collector of Customs, Bombay and Anr., AIR 1997 SC 2658; V.M. Salgaocar and Brothers (P) Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income Tax, AIR 2000 SC 1623; Kunhayammed and Ors. v. State of Kerala and Anr., AIR 2000 SC 2587; Saurashtra Oil Mills Assn. Gujarat v. State of Gujarat and Anr., AIR 2002 SC 1130 and Union of India and Ors. v. Jaipal Singh, (2004) 1 SCC 121. A perusal of these judgments leave no manner of doubt that the dismissal of the Special Leave Petition in limine does not mean that the reasoning of the judgment of the High Court against which the Special Leave Petition had been filed before the Supreme Court stands affirmed or the judgment and order impugned merges with such order of the Supreme Court on dismissal of the petition. It simply means that the Apex Court did not consider the case worth examining of the reason which may be other than merit of the case. Nor the order of the Supreme Court operates as res-judicata. An order rejecting the Special Leave Petition at the threshold without detailed reasons therefore does not constitute any declaration of law of a binding precedent.