KALEY KHAN Vs. STATE OF U P

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This special appeal arises out of order and judgment dated January 19, 1993 passed by learned single Judge, dismissing the writ petition filed by the appellants, who are engaged in business of manufacture of Bidies. The appellants in the said writ petition challenged the validity of the notification dated June 21, 1993 issued by the State Government in exercise of power under Section 3(b) of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). By the aforesaid notification the State Government revised and fixed minimum rates of wages for the various categories of employees employed in Bidi making industry with a view to secure public convenience, maintenance of public order and maintaining employment. The learned Single Judge upheld the validity of the aforesaid notification. Aggrieved the appellants have filed this appeal. By agreement of the parties, the counter affidavits and rejoinder-affidavits filed in Writ Petition No. 22661 of 1991 have been read as part of record of this Special Appeal.

(2.) Before us Sri Sudhir Chandra, learned counsel for the appellant, assailed the judgment of learned Single Judge on number of grounds which we shall notice hereinafter. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the State Government has acted ultra vires in exercising the powers under Section 3(b) of the Act and view taken by the learned single Judge contrary to it is not correct. According to the learned counsel the conditions precedent for exercising powers under Section 3(b) of the Act were totally absent and inasmuch as no emergency, much less any acute emergency, existed for issuing the impugned notification. On the other hand Sri Raj Kumar Jain, learned counsel on behalf of the respondents, defended the validity of the impugned notification.

(3.) In State of U.P. v. Basti Sugar Mills (1960-I-LLJ-220) the Supreme Court while examining nature of power contained in under Section 3 of the Act held as thus; "The opening words of Section 3 of the Act, indicates that the provisions thereof are to be availed of in an emergency. It is true that even a reference to an Arbitrator or a Conciliator could be made only if there is an emergency. But then an emergency may be acute. Such, an emergency may necessitate the exercise of power under Clause (b) and a mere resort to those under Clause (d) may be inadequate to meet this situation. Whether to resort to one provision or other must depend upon the subjective satisfaction of the State Government upon which the powers to act under Section 3 of the Act have been conferred by the Legislature." This decision has been consistently followed by this Court.