ZILA SAHKARI BANK Vs. PRESIDING OFFICER LABOUR COURT

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The petitioner challenges the award dated November 27, 1982 passed by the respondent No. 2, notified on December 11, 1982.

(2.) It appears that the respondent No. 3, who was appointed as Chaukidar in the petitioner Bank on probation for a period of one year, had raised an industrial dispute that his services were terminated as probationer on September 22, 1979. The reference was made by the U.P. Government to the Labour Court as to whether the order terminating the service of the respondent No. 3 was valid and if not, to what relief he was entitled to. The Labour Court heard the matter and by its award set aside the order of termination of the services of the respondent No. 3. It was submitted by the petitioner in this writ petition that the respondent No. 2 was the Presiding Officer of the Labour Court. He was not qualified to be appointed as the Presiding Officer of the Labour Court as he has not worked for a period of three years as a District Judge or an Addl. District Judge or he has not held the office of the Chairman or any other member of the Labour Court, Appellate Tribunal constituted under the Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunals) Act, 1950 or of any Tribunal for a period not less than two years or he has not been a Presiding Officer of a Labour Court constituted under any Provincial State Act for a period of not less than five years or he has not held any judicial office in India for not less than seven years. The respondent No. 2, therefore, had no jurisdiction to decide the dispute. On merits it was submitted that the respondent No. 3 was a purely temporary employee. His services were terminated during the period of probation, which could be done in pursuance of the contract of appointment. The termination of the services of the respondent No. 3 was, therefore, valid and the Labour Court has committed an error by setting aside the same. It is contended that the conduct of respondent No. 3 was found unsatisfactory and on that basis his services were terminated, which could not cast any stigma on the respondent No. 3

(3.) In the counter-affidavit filed by the respondent No. 3 it is submitted that the respondent No. 2 was qualified to be appointed as the Presiding Officer or the Labour Court. Anything said to the contrary in the writ petition was denied. It is contended that the petitioner had no right to terminate the services of the respondent No. 3 without following the procedure established by law. The procedure under the Industrial Disputes Act was not followed before terminating the services of the respondent No. 3. Therefore, the Labour Court could pass the award, which is valid. The termination of the services of the respondent No. 3 would amount to retrenchment which could be passed only after complying with the procedure laid down in the Industrial Disputes Act.