SHARDA PRASAD Vs. SAMPATI DEVI

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THE interminable disputes between landlords and tenants, which constitute the bulk civil litigation in the urban areas of Uttar Pradesh, often give rise to interesting questions of law. One such point has cropped up in the instant case. It relates to the interpretation of Section 21 of the U.P. Act 13 of 1972 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'). Before reproducing the relevant provisions it would be necessary to mention the salient facts of the case.

(2.) THE Respondents Nos. 1 to 4 are the landlords of premises No. 199 Badshahi Mandi, Allahabad. They filed an application Under Section 21(1)(a) of the Act for release of the accommodation situate on the ground -floor thereof, which was in possession of the Petitioner -tenants, Sharda Prasad. In short, the case of the landlords was that the family of the late Sri. Tipu Lal, since dead, (the applicants being his descendants), had considerably increased and the accommodation in their possession was not sufficient to cope with their needs. Consequently, it was prayed that the portion situated on the ground -floor in occupation of the tenant (present Petitioner) be released in favour of the landlords for their own use and occupation. The application was resisted on the ground that the alleged need of the landlords was not bonafide, that they had other accommodation also at their disposal and in the event of any release order being passed in their favour the tenant would suffer much greater hardship. The release application was dismissed by the Prescribed Authority against which an appeal was preferred by the landlords which was also dismissed. Aggrieved by that order the landlords filed a writ petition in this Court, being writ petition No. 1028 of 1977, which was allowed by the order dated 28 -2 -1979. The main point which had been canvassed on behalf of the landlord in that writ petition was that during the pendency of the writ petition the tenant had purchased house No. 354 Mohatishmganj, Allahabad and was residing in that house and the accommodation in dispute was actually lying vacant; hence the landlords were entitled to release of the accommodation in dispute. On these allegations this Court allowed the writ petition filed by the landlords and the order passed by the Appellate Authority was quashed with a direction to decide the appeal afresh in accordance with law and in the light of the observations made in the judgment. It was expressly observed by this Court that the Appellate Authority would permit the parties to adduce evidence on the new point urged in this Court, namely, the alleged purchase of house by the tenant during the pendency of the writ petition. Yet another direction contained in the High Court order was that the Authority concerned would decide first whether the needs of the landlords was bonafide. In pursuance of the High Court judgment the parties were directed by the Appellate Authority to adduce evidence and a copy of the sale deed dated 17 -1 -1978 relating to House No. 354 Mohatshimganj, Allahabad executed in favour of Shri Nath, minor son of Sharda Prasad (Tenant) was also filed. The Appellate Authority by its order dated 6 -5 -1980 allowed the landlords appeal and it is this order which is impugned in the present writ petition.

(3.) I am unable to accede to the submission made at the Bar that the order under challenge does not contain any finding that the accommodation was bonafide required by the landlords. It is an elaborate judgment dealing with all the relevant, factual aspects of the case and takes into consideration in great detail the strength of the families of the landlords and the tenant and the accommodations occupied by them respectively. It also examines in all its niceties the gradual increase in the number of the members constituting the family of the landlords with the passage of time, pointedly referring to the present position when their inflated family had obliged them to apply for release. A map of the accommodation occupied by the landlords has been commented upon in detail and it has been observed that excluding the two rooms which were being used by them as shops, the rest of the accommodation consisted of merely three rooms and Verandah, Kitchen, common courtyard and common passage etc. It has also been noticed that the family of the landlords is now comprised of 22 members. In these circumstances even though there may not be a categorical finding that the need or the landlords was bonafide, in substance such finding can be easily read between the lines. The tenor of the judgment leaves no room for doubting the accent placed by the learned Judge on the paucity of accommodation suffered by the landlords and their dire need for more accommodation. There is no formula prescribed in which a finding of this nature must be recorded. The point is concluded by the inference drawn by the Appellate Authority in these words: