OM PARKASH SHARMA Vs. DISTRICT JUDGE

JUDGEMENT

(1.) AN application was made by Smt. Savitri Devi, representative No. 2 under Section 21 of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) for release of an accommodation in possession of the petitioner as tenant on that she needed this accommodation bonafide her own use and for the use of her daughters inasmuch as the accommodation at her disposal was inadequate. The application was contested by the petitioner and was dismissed by the Prescribed Authority. An appeal was preferred by respondent No. 2 before the District Judge, which has been allowed. The District Judge has come to the conclusion that the need of respondent No. 2 was bonafide and that greater hardship would be caused to her in the event of the application for release being dismissed that the hardship likely to be caused to the petitioner on the said application being allowed. It is this order of the District Judge, which is sought to be quashed in the present petition.

(2.) IT was urged by counsel for the petitioner that the application for release was not maintainable inasmuch as there was four co-owners of the accommodation in question but the said application had been filed only by one of them, namely, respondent No. 2 similar plea was raised before the Prescribed Authority and the District Judge but was repelled. In my opinion the view taken in this behalf by the Prescribed Authority and the District Judge does not suffer from any such error which may justify any interference in a writ petition. A copy of the application to release made by respondent No. 2 before the Prescribed authority has been filed as Annexure 1 to the petition. Its perusal indicates that the late husband of respondent No. 2, Lokman Das Sharma, was the owner of the accommodation in question and he died in the year 1972. It has further been stated in the said application that respondent No. 2 had no son and had only three daughters, one of whom had been married but was living with respondent No. 2 along with her husband and two sons. It has also been stated in the said application that since respondent No. 2 had no son or other male member and had two unmarried daughters, her married daughter as well as her husband and children were living with her for her protection and for looking after her. On the death of Lokman Das Sharma, husband of Smt. Savitri Devi the accommodation in question devolved upon Smt. Savitri Devi, respondent No. 2 in her capacity as widow of late Lokman Das Sharma and also upon his three daughters. The fact that there were four co-owners of the accommodation in question was thus not suppressed by respondent No. 2 in her application for release and her case in this behalf was known to the petitioner from the very inception. The Prescribed Authority has pointed out in its order that the petitioner had admitted in his reply that he was the tenant of respondent No. 2 and that he had not produced any evidence to indicate that the rent had been paid by him even to the daughters of respondent No. 2. It is, thus, a case where on the findings recorded by the Prescribed Authority and the District Judge rent was paid by the petitioner to respondent No. 2 alone after the death of her husband, Lokman Das Sharma. The term 'Landlord' has been defined in Section 3(j) of the Act. According to this definition Landlord in relation to a building, means a person to whom its rent is or if the building were let would be payable, and includes, except in Clause (g), the agent or attorney of such person. In the instant case respondent No. 2 is not a stranger but is one of the co-owners of the accommodation in question. Further it is one of those cases in which prejudice cannot be said to have been caused to the petitioner on account of the application for release being made not by all the co-owners of the accommodation in question but only by respondent No. 2. The correct facts, as seen above, had already been stated by respondent No. 2 in her application for release and it cannot be said that any prejudice has been caused to the petitioner simply because the three daughters of respondent No. 2 had also not joined as applicants in the application for release. On the facts of the instant case, I am of the opinion that the submission that the application for release was not maintainable inasmuch as it had not been filed by all the co-owners has no substance.

(3.) LASTLY it was urged by the counsel for petitioner that the impugned order passed by the District Judge is liable to be quashed inasmuch as he has failed to give effect to the provisions contained in Rule 6(1)(d) of the Rules framed under the Act. I find it difficult to accept even this submission. Rule 16(1)(d) provides that where the tenant's need would be adequately met by leaving with him a part of the building under tenancy and the Landlord's need would be served by releasing other part the Prescribed Authority shall release only the latter part of the building. The District Judge has pointed out that the respondent No. 2 was living in the same accommodation in which the petitioner was living and that the court-yard, the main door and the bathroom were common. He has also pointed out that the relations between the parties were strained and a criminal case was pending against the tenant for assaulting respondent No. 2 and her married daughter, Smt. Rajkumari. The District Judge has observed that a part from Smt. Raj Kumari, representative No. 2 had two grown up daughters and it would not be expedient to allow a stranger to live in almost joint portion of the house along with grown up daughters of respondent No. 2. He has further observed that the petitioner was a complete stranger and it will, therefore, be difficult to maintain any privacy in a family which has got mostly women members. In my opinion, these cogent grounds on account of which it would not be expedient to allow the application for release only for a part of the accommodation in the tenancy of the petitioner. On the facts of the instance case and in view of the observations made above, I am of the opinion that the impugned order does not deserve to be quashed on this ground either.