SHISHUPAL GOSWAMI Vs. BHAGWAN SWARUP AND OTHERS

JUDGEMENT

(1.) SHISHU Pal Goswami has been a tenant of a portion of house No. 417, Bagh Guddar Bareilly of which Bhagwan Swarup is landlord. On 14.8.1978 the landlord filed a suit in the Court of Judge, Small Causes, against the petitioner for his eviction from the premises in dispute on the ground of his being in arrears of rent. The petitioner -tenant filed a written statement and contested the suit. He asserted that the rate of rent was Rs. 28/ - per mensem, whereas the landlord has wrongly claimed rent at the rate of Rs. 50/ -. The tenant further asserted that he had paid rent but no receipts had been issued to him by the landlord and he has never been in arrears and the suit was liable to be dismissed. The suit could not be tried or decided on merits as the landlord and the tenant both entered into a written compromise which was filed. Both the parties requested that the suit be decreed in terms of the compromise. The Judge, Small Causes, decreed the suit in terms of the compromise on 19th May, 1979. The petitioner continued to be in possession of the disputed premises even after the compromise decree. The landlord made an execution application for the enforcement of the decree and for the eviction of the tenant. The petitioner filed an objection asserting that he could not be ejected from the premises in dispute in terms of the compromise decree as the same was null and void. The Judge Small Causes rejected the petitioner's objection and by his order dated 2.12.1980 directed the petitioner's ejectment. The petitioner preferred a revision against the order of the Judge, Small Causes, before the District Judge. On 6.2.1981, the District Judge upheld the order of the Judge, Small Causes, on the finding that under the compromise decree the petitioner was liable to ejectment. The petitioner has by means of this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution challenged validity of the order of the Judge, Small Causes, dated 2.12.1980 and the order dated 6.2.1981, passed by the District Judge. Sri Bhagwati Prasad Singh, learned counsel for the petitioner, urged that under the terms of the compromise no decree for petitioner's ejectment could be passed and the petitioner could not be ejected as a fresh tenancy had come into existence in pursuance of clause 6 of the compromise. There is no dispute between the parties that the landlord's suit was decreed in terms of the compromise filed by the parties. The terms and conditions set forth in the compromise formed part of the decree. Under the compromise the petitioner agreed that the plaintiff -landlord's suit for ejectment be decreed but he will have no right to execute the said decree for a period of 17 months and if the tenant failed to hand over possession to the landlord within 17 months it would be open to the landlord to execute the decree. In order to appreciate the contention it is necessary to refer to clauses 1 and 6 of the compromise, which are in the following terms:

(2.) THE petitioner's contention is that under clause 6 of the compromise both the parties agreed that if the petitioner failed to vacate the premises he will be liable to pay rent at the rate of Rs. 50/ - per mensem instead of Rs. 28/ -. The landlord's agreement to allow the petitioner to remain in possession of the disputed premises at enhanced rent indicates that a fresh tenancy was created between the parties. This submission completely overlooks and ignores the important terms of the compromise as contained in clause 1. Under that clause the tenant clearly agreed that the landlord's suit for his ejectment should be decreed with a condition that the decree shall not be executed for a period of 17 months and if he failed to vacate the premises by that time it would be open to the landlord to execute the decree. While construing the terms of the compromise the intention of the parties has to be ascertained and for that purpose it is necessary that the compromise as a whole should be considered it is not permissible to read clause 6 in isolation of clause 1. If clause 6 is read along with clause 1 of the compromise the intention of the parties becomes apparent. On a reading of both the clauses it is clear that the petitioner tenant agreed that a decree for ejectment be passed against him. The parties intended that the tenant be allowed to continue in possession of the premises for a period of 17 months and during this period the tenant undertook to hand over possession to the landlord but in case he failed to do so the landlord was entitled to execute the decree against him, although for 17 months the landlord had agreed not to execute the decree. The parties further intended that if the tenant vacated the premises within 17 months he will be entitled to pay rent at the rate of Rs. 28/ - but in case for some reason he failed to vacate the premises he will be liable to pay rent at the rate of Rs. 50/ - per month. From the use the word 'kiraya' (rent) the intention of the parties appear to be that in case the tenant failed to vacate the premises within 17 months he will be liable to pay damages for use and occupation of the same. On a fair construction of the terms of the compromise it is apparent that the petitioner had entered into agreement with the landlord, according to which he agreed to vacate the premises within 17 months and he further agreed that a decree for ejectment be passed against him. There was no question of creating a fresh tenancy. If the interpretation of clause 6 as suggested by learned counsel is accepted, clause 1 of the compromise would be rendered nugatory. It is not permissible to interpret a document in a manner as to render one of its clauses nugatory. I am therefore of the opinion that the Courts below rightly held that under the compromise the petitioner had undertaken to vacate the premises within 17 months and that a decree for his eviction had been passed by the Judge Small Causes.

(3.) SECTION 20 of the U.P. Act 1972 imposes ban on the filing of a suit for eviction of a tenant. Sub -section (2) permits filing of a suit for eviction of a tenant on one or more of the grounds specified therein. Sub -section (5) lays down that nothing in the section shall affect the power of the Court to pass a decree on the basis of an agreement, compromise or satisfaction recorded under rule 3 of Order XXIII of the First Schedule to the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 Section 34 of the Act further prescribes the procedure to be followed in holding an enquiry or in hearing any appeal or revision. It lays down that the Prescribed Authority or any other authority constituted under the Act shall for the purpose of holding of enquiry and for hearing any appeal or revision shall have the same power as a Court under the Code of Civil Procedure when trying a suit in respect of a matter set out therein. Section 34(1)(f) confers specific power to record a lawful agreement, compromise or satisfaction and make an order in accordance therewith. Section 20(5) read with Section 34(1)(f) of the Act make it amply clear that a Judge, Small Causes Court, while trying a suit for eviction of a tenant is competent like any other Civil Court to record a compromise and pass a decree in accordance with the same. The Judge, Small Cause Court, was competent to decree the landlord's suit in accordance with the terms of the compromise and the same cannot be held to be a nullity. The Supreme Court's decisions do not apply to the instant case in view of the specific provisions contained in Section 20(5) and Section 34 of the 1972 Act permitting the Court to record compromises and pass decree in terms of the same.