ABDUL KARIM Vs. SMT. PREMWATI AND OTHERS

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS is a Defendant's appeal against the judgment dt. 10 -2 -1973 of the 2nd Addl. Civil Judge, Aligarh, dismissing the Appellant's appeal and confirming the trial court's judgment decreeing the Plaintiff -Respondent's suit for ejectment of the Appellant from the premises in suit and for possession.

(2.) THE relevant facts are that the Appellant was a tenant of the premises in suit situate within the Municipal limits of Aligarh and Ram Kishan Khurana, the deceased Plaintiff was his landlord. Under Sub -section (1) of Section 3 of the U.P. (Temp.) Control of Rent and Eviction Act the Plaintiff obtained the necessary permission of filing a suit against the Appellant on the ground that the Plaintiff required the accommodation for his personal needs. In the meanwhile the Plaintiff served a composite notice on the Appellant on 3 -11 -1967 calling upon the Appellant to pay arrears of rent which had fallen due for a period of more than three months and also terminating the tenancy on the expiry of the notice -period. The Appellant neither cleared off the arrears of rent within the specified period nor vacated the premises on the termination of the tenancy, hence the suit.

(3.) THE contention put forward on behalf of the Appellant does not appear to have any force and the ruling cited has no application to the facts of this case. The case cited on behalf of the Appellant arose under the provisions of the Delhi Rent Control Act. Under that Act there is no provision for obtaining a prior permission for filing a suit, in the manner required Under Sub -section (1) of Section 3 of the U.P. (Temp.) Control of Rent and Eviction Act. In the case decided by the Supreme Court it was pointed out that legal representatives of a landlord (since deceased) have no right to continue the proceeding as initiated by the landlord for ejectment of the tenant Under Section 14(1)(e) of Delhi Rent Control Act because the bona fide requirement of the premises for the residence of himself (landlord) and his family members (together) is his personal requirement. Such a personal cause of action must perish with him when the application for ejectment has not been decided on merits and further, when the continuance of the proceeding requires determination of wholly different and distinct issues. From what has been quoted it is apparent that in the case before the Supreme Court the question whether the landlord needed the premises for his personal use or not, remained undecided when the landlord died. Moreover, under the Delhi Rent Control Act the Rent Controller decides whether a tenant is liable to be ejected on the ground that the premises is needed by the landlord for his residence. Under the U.P. (Temp.) Control of Rent and Eviction Act there is no such provision. The landlord has to apply to the D.M. for permission to file a suit for evicting the tenant and thus in a way for removal of the bar imposed by the Act preventing a landlord from exercising his rights as such under the Transfer of Property Act. Once a permission has been obtained under the U.P. (Temp.) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, the restrictions imposed on a landlord are removed and the landlord becomes free to exercise his rights as such under the Transfer of Property Act. It has been held in a number of cases even by the Supreme Court that once permission has been obtained Under Sub -section (1) of Section 3, the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to go behind it vide Ram Swarup v. Shikar Chand : 1966 AWR 77 : AIR 1966 SC 893 paras 11 and 12. In this case, as has been mentioned, the landlord, namely, Ram Kishan Khurana obtained the necessary permission Under Sub -section (1) of Section 3 and thereby the restrictions imposed on the landlord from evicting his tenant were removed. Moreover, as has been mentioned, by a valid notice the landlord terminated the tenancy and, therefore, on the date the suit was filed, the Appellant ceased to be a tenant of the premises and hence became liable to be ejected. The fact that the Plaintiff died during the pendency of the suit does not revive the tenancy of the Appellant and it could not be said that the rights conferred on a tenant under the U.P. (Temp.) Control of Rent and Eviction Act were also revived. Once the Tenancy came to an end, the position of the Appellant became that of a trespasser or a person occupying the premises without any right and the owner of the premises will have the right to get him evicted. It is not in dispute that the present Respondents are the legal representatives of Ram Kishan Khurana and, therefore, entitled to continue the suit in order to evict the Appellant who had no subsisting right to continue to occupy the premises as a tenant.