GRAM SABHA, KUDRA Vs. NOOR MOHD. KHAN

JUDGEMENT

(1.) These are four connected special appeals and arise from the judgment and order of a learned single Judge of this Court dated 3rd Dec. 1969 deciding Writ Petitions Nos. 636, 637, 638 and 648 all of 1967 filed in the following circumstances :

(2.) The dispute between the parties relates to plot Nos. 103/1 and 106-A. In the basic year Noor Mohd. and others were recorded as grove holder of these plots. An objection under Sec. 9 of the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act (hereinafter called the Act) was filed by Salim Khan 'who is respondent No. 8 of Spl. Appeals Nos. 95 and 96 of 1970 and respondent No. 1 of Spl. Appeals Nos. 97 and 98 of 1970. He claimed to be the grove holder of these plots exclusively and contested the title of persons whose names were recorded in the basic year. The Consolidation Officer upheld the 3 objection of Salim Khan hording him sole grove-holder of plot No. 106-A and cogrove-holder in grove plot No. 103/1 with Noor Mohd. and others. Two appeals were filed against this decision one by Salim Khan and another by Noor Mohd. Khan and another the settlement Officer (Consolidation) held Salim Khan to be the sole grove-holder of both the plots. Against this decision two revisions were filed before the Deputy Director of Consolidation. They were allowed. The decision of the Deputy Director of Consolidation was that neither Noor Mohd. Khan and others nor Salim Khan had any right in or title to the two plots; plot No. 103/1 was tank and plot No. 106-A was Banjar and these two plots became vested in the Gaon Sabha and that the names of Noor Mohd. Khan and others were in-correctly recorded. The names of Noor Mohd. Khan and others were ordered to be expunged and the name of Gaon Sabha was ordered to be substituted in the plots. It is against this decision that the aforesaid four Writ Petitions were filed, two of them by Noor Mohd. Khan and others and the other two by Salim Khan. All these four petitions while decided by the learned Single Judge by one judgment and it is this judgment, the correctness of which is questioned in the present special appeals before us. The learned Single Judge allowed the writ petitions holding that the Gaon Sabha not having filed objection under the Act the Deputy Director of Consolidation had no jurisdiction under Sec. 48 of the Act to decide the question of title in favour of Gaon Sabha not to the bar of Sec. 11-A of the Act. In this regard the learned single Judge also expressed the opinions that Gaon Sabha not having filed an objection under Sec. 9 of the Act within limitation the entries in the basic year obtaining in favour of Noor Mohd. Khan and others became final and could it, not be disturbed subsequently by the Deputy Director of Consolidation acting under Sec. 49 of the Act. Learned counsel for the appellants Sri B. R. Gupta argued before us that the learned Single Judge was not correct in this view because Sec. 49 of the Act confers suo motu powers on the Deputy Director of Consolidation to correct any orders passed in consolidation proceedings by lower authorities. No doubt, Sec. 48 is in terms very widely worded and gives power to the Deputy Director to call for and examine record of any case decided or proceedings taken by any subordinate authority for the purpose of satisfying himself as to the regularity, correctness, legality or propriety of any order gassed by such authority in the case or proceedings and to make such order in the case or proceedings as he thinks fit. But we cannot lose sight of the provision contained in Sec. 11-A of the Act. Sec. 11-A is these terms :

(3.) The substance of the provision is that no person, who has not filed an objection under Sec. 9 regarding claim to land, partition of joint holding and valuation of plots trees, wells, and other improvements etc. within the period prescribed therefor under the Act, shall be permitted to raise such an objection, nor shall any such objection be heard at any subsequent stage of the consolidation proceedings. We desire to underline the words "at any subsequent stage of the consolidation proceedings which occur in Sec. 11-A. These words arc so wide as to include stage of proceedings under Sec. 48 of the Act and without room for controversy enact a bar both to the raising and hearing of an objection on a question in respect of claim to land etc. which could be raised under Sec. 9 of the Act at any subsequent stage if such a claim has not been raised within the period prescribed therefor. As a result of this bar contained in Sec. 11-A the Gaon Sabha which admittedly had not filed an objection under Sec. 9 of the Act within the prescribed time, could not be permitted to file an objection claiming right or title to these plots before the Deputy Director of Consolidation nor could the Gaon Sabha be heard by the Deputy Director of Consolidation on such an objection. It could not be the intention of the Legislature that the policy laid down by it under Sec. 11-A of the Act should be defeated by exercise of suo motu powers by the Deputy Director of Consolidation under Sec. 48. It will be contrary to all established canons of interpretation of statutes to accept the argument that what could not be achieved; by, the Gaon Sabha by a belated objection claiming title to this land before the Deputy Director of consolidation due to the bar of Sec. 11-A of the Act could be. achieved by the Deputy Director of Consolidation through exercise of his suo motu power under Sec. 48. The well-known rule of interpretation of statutes is that a particular provision of a statute should be so interpreted as to harmonise with the other provisions of the same statutes and not in away that it may render superfluous or nugatory another provision of the statute. If we were to hold that title respecting claim or right to land could be decided at any stage by the Deputy Director of Consolidation in exercise of his suo motu power under Sec. 48 despite the bar of Sec. 11-A then such an interpretation will clearly militate against the provision contained it Sec. 11-A. On the principle of harmonious construction, therefore, we agree with the interpretation, placed on Sec. 48 and the scope of suo motu power of the Deputy Director of Consolidation by the learned Single Judge and hold that because the Gaon Sabha had not filed an objection under Sec. 9 within limitation it was barred by Sec. 11-A from raising an objection respecting such claim or from being heard respecting such claim at any subsequent stage of the consolidation proceedings and that being so, the Deputy Director of Consolidation could not in exercise of his suo motu powers under Sec. 48 enquire into the right or title of the Gaon Sabha which was not a party to any consolidation proceeding before the subordinate authorities. On the principle of harmonious construction we are of the view that the scope of power conferred by Sec. 48 on the Deputy Director of Consolidation to adjudicate upon the regularity, correctness or legality of an order passed by a subordinate consolidation authority must remain confined to matters between the parties before the consolidation authorities and this power cannot extend to persons who are not parties to the consolidation proceedings at any stage or to complete strangers or outsiders to these proceedings. In that view of the matter we agree with the learned single judge in the view that the Deputy Director had no jurisdiction to hold that the land in dispute had become vested in Gaon Sabha and that the name of Gaon Sabha should be substituted in place of Noor Mohd. Khan and others. We do not find any force in the argument of the learned counsel and in the result these appeals must fail.