(1.) These Second Appeals have been referred to a run Bench by a learned single Judge of this Court for decision of one single question of law which arises in each one of them. All these appeals arise out of suits filed by the landlord for the ejectment of his tenant and the question for consideration is whether a thirty days notice of ejectment under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act as amended by U.P. Act No. XXIV of 1954 was valid in each case. Apart from the validity or invalidity of the notice for ejectment no other question was pressed before the learned single judge nor has any other question been raised before us in the Full Bench. Thus, that is the only point which requires consideration in these appeals. We would deal with the general question first and then dispose or the individual appeals.
(2.) The relevant part of Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act after its amendment by the said U. P. Act is as follows: "In the absence of a contract or local usage to the contrary ........a lease of immovable property for any other purpose shall be deemed to be a lease from month to month terminable on the part of the lessor of the lessee by thirty days notice." In each of these cases, the notice which was served by tne landlord on the tenant purported to say that the tenant should vacate the premises "within thirty days of the service of notice." The point raised which requires consideration is whether the words "within 30 days" without any other restrictive expression do not give complete thirty days notice as required by the Act. A Division Bench of this Court took this view in Kashi Pd. Gupta v. Rup Narain, 1952 R.D. 187 (All). A contrary view was, however, taken by another Division Bench of this Court in Ahmad Ali v. Mohd. Jamal Uddin, 1963 All LJ 567: (AIR 1963 All 581).
(3.) On a plain reading of the section a tenant is entitled to get thirty days notice before his tenancy is terminated. This means that after the receipt of the notice, the tenant should have thirty days in order to make alternative arrangements and to leave the premises. The object of the notice is to give a reasonable time to the tenant to make other arrangements and to vacate the premises. After service of notice the tenancy would come to an end on the mid-night of the thirtieth day. Alter We termination of the tenancy the tenant would have no right to continue to remain in possession of the premises and consequently it is obvious that he has to vacate the premises before that point of time. It cannot be the purpose of the law to permit the tenant to remain m illegal possession of the premises even for one moment there is no provision in law authorising a tenant to continue to remain in possession of the premises without tine consent of the landlord after the expiry of his tenancy even for the purpose of vacating the premises. As of necessity, therefore, the tenant has to vacate the premises within the period allowed to him by the law. It is his choice whether to vacate it on the last moment of the thirtieth day or a little earlier according to his convenience. The words used in the present notices asking the tenant to vacate the premises within thirty days from the date of service of the notice only fix the outer limit by which the tenant must vacate. The limit fixed is the last moment of the thirtieth day of the notice. Apart from the authorities, which will be considered hereafter, the notices given in these cases appear to be strictly according to the letter and spirit of the law.