SUGHRA BEGUM Vs. QASIM HUSAIN

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The appellant in this appeal is a judgment-debtor against whom a decree was passed oh 3rd Jan. 1949. The last application for execution was moved on 2nd Jan. 1961, and the contention of the appellant was that it was barred by time. The application would be barred by time, if two earlier application moved on 3rd Jan. 1955, and 8th Feb. 1958, were barred by time. But if those applications were within time, even the last application would be within time. What has, therefore, to be seen is whether the aforesaid earlier applications dated 3rd Jan. 1955 and 8th Feb. 1958, were within time.

(2.) The first application for execution was moved on 21st Dec. 1951. The second application dated 3rd, Jan. 1955, was, therefore, moved more than three years thereafter and the same was the case in respect of the third application, which was filed on 8th Feb. 1958. The Civil Judge has pointed out that Limitation for execution under Article 182 of the Limitation Act was raised from three years to six years under the U. P. Civil Laws (Reforms and Amendments) Act, 24 of 1954, and that, therefore, six years limitation was available to the decree-holder for applying for execution and if that is so, both the applications would obviously be within time.

(3.) The contention of the appellant was that since the decree was passed in 1949, very much earlier that the enactment of U. P. Act 24 of 1954, the proceedings in execution would continue to be governed by the old law. It is difficult, however, to accept that contention. No authority was cited in support of the proposition that limitation for future applications for execution would be governed by the law in force on the date at the suit or the date of the decree. There is no vested right in a Judgment-debtor that limitation for such an application would continue to be the same for all times to come. If, of course, a particular proceeding gets time-barred by the time the law of limitation is amended, vested rights are created in favour of persons, against whom limitation has already expired, and unless retrospective effect is given to the amending legislation, those vested rights cannot be reopened by extending the period of limitation. Limitation for the second execution application had not expired against the present appellants when the U. P. Act 24 of 1954 received the assent of the President or was published in the Gazette. It would have expired not earlier than 22nd Dec. 1954, while the Act was placed on the Statute Book En November, 1954. When, therefore, the decree-holder got extended period of limitation for applying for execution before limitation for his application had expired, he could take advantage of the amendment in the law of Limitation. No vested right having been created in favour of the appellants, they cannot contend that an application moved more than three years after, the earlier application was to be regarded as barred by time against them.