(1.) I have had the advantage of reading the judgments of our brothers Jagdish Sahai and Dwivedi and agree with the view taken by the latter. The most important fact is that the legislature has not said anywhere that a widow who has inherited bhumidhari rights from her husband has only a life interest and cannot transfer the bhumidhari rights permanently. On the other hand, S. 152 has made the interest of a bhumidhar transferable subject only to the conditions contained in Chapter VIII. Bhumidhari rights being heritable can be inherited by different classes of heirs but the legislature has made no attempt to distinguish between bhumidhari rights inherited by one class of heirs from those inherited by another class of heirs except in regard to succession or death. Other provisions in the Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act concerning bhumidhari rights apply to all persons owning bhumidhari rights regardless of bow they acquired them or from whom they inherited them. The legislature ban made no distinction between the nature of bhumidhari rights inherited by a son from his father and the nature of those inherited by a Hindu widow from her husband and of those inherited by a Muslim widow from her husband. Section 152 applies to all bhumidhars alike. Consequently the interest of a bhumidhar inherited by a widow from the husband is as much transferable (of course subject to the conditions contained in Ch. VIII) as that inherited by a son from his father. Had the legislature intended to confer only a life interest on a widow inheriting bhumidhari rights from her husband one would have expected it to say so expressly; such a fundamental proposition of law would not have been left merely to be inferred from certain circumstances.
(2.) AN agricultural tenant has no religion and no personal law except as expressly provided in the Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act. It applies to Hindus, Muslims, Christians etc. regardless of their religion and, therefore, regardless or their personal law except as regards succession in certain cases. It contains its own provisions regarding inheritance and transfers; and when it has left certain matters to be governed by the personal law it has done so by an express provision. Personal law has never been applied proprio vigore to questions of inheritance and transfer of tenancy rights as it has been applied to inheritance and transfer of proprietary rights.
(3.) IT happens that under Hindu Law a Hindu widow acquires only a life interest by inheritance and on her death succession reopens to the last male-holder, but life interest is not a sine qua non of succession reopening to the previous holder. There is nothing repugnant between a person having only a life interest and the interest being inherited by a person directly related not to her but to some other person. Succession is not so connected with life tenancy that it can be said that one line of succession is wholly repugnant to life tenancy. Any line of succession can exist with life tenancy; succession opens on death and after death the question whether the deceased had life tenancy or absolute property becomes wholly irrelevant. Succession is to whatever property is left by the deceased and there is absolutely no difficulty in making it inheritable by any person. Consequently life tenancy cannot be inferred merely because the law lays down a particular line of succession similar to that prevailing in respect of Hindu widows, particularly when the law does not distinguish between Hindu tenants and others.