HAR MURAT Vs. STATE

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This is an application by Har Murat in revision against his conviction and sentence under Section 7, Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act, 1946, for infringement of Clause 3 (IX) at the U. P. Foodgraim Movement Control Order, 1949 There Is no controversy about the facts; it has been proved that the applicant drove a motor truck containing twenty-four bags of rice from village Gharawal to village Malvan, both places being within Mirzapur district, on 5-4-50. By. that act the applicant did not contravene Clause 3 (ix) of the Foodgrains Movement Control Order. Clause 3 (ix) of the Order does not contain any mandatory provision; it only mentions a saving provision. It is therefore meaning-less to talk of contravention of the provision of Clause 3 (ix). Really it is Clause 3 (vii) that the applicant is said to have infringed. That provision is to the effect that

(2.) The plea that Section 7, Essential Supplies Act, is "ultra vires' has been abandoned in view of this Court's decision that it is not 'ultra vires'. Mr. Sripati Narain Singh urged that the applicant did not "carry" rice because he was only taking it back from a mill. The rice belonged to Kesri Singh Jaiswal, who was also the owner of the truck, and the applicant was Kesri Singh's servant employed to drive the truck. Even if the applicant had taken the rice from Kesri Singh Jaiswal's house to a mill and was taking it back after getting certain operations done upon the rice, it does not mean that he was not "carrying" it from one place to another. There is no justification for saying that taking back does not amount to "carrying". (3) Next it was urged that Clause 3 (vii), Food-grains Movement Control Order, is unconstitutional inasmuch as it contravenes Articles 14 and 19 (g) of the Constitution. The provision simply forbids the carriage of some foodgrains from, one place to another in the United Provinces; it does not affect the right of any person to practise any profession or to carry on any occupation, trade or business. A person can practice any profession or carry on any occupation, trade or business even if he is forbidden to carry by rail or motor certain foodgrains from one place to another in the United Provinces. But even if it be said that the provision restricts this right of every citizen guaranteed by Article 19 (G) the restriction is reasonable and in the interests of the general public. Article 19 does not affect the operation of any existing law in so far as it imposes reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right to practise any profession or to carry on any occupation, trade or business, in the interests of the general public; see Sub-article (5). It was in the interests of the general public that certain restrictions have been imposed by the State Government on the movement of some foodgrains by certain means. Neither is the carrying of all foodgrains from one place to another place forbidden, nor is the carrying of rice from one place to another by any means prohibited. The prohibition is only on the carriage of rice by rail or motor vehicle; the carriage of rice by carts or on heads or on animals is not at all prohibited.

(3.) Further there is a provision in the Order that it will not apply to the movement of any food-grains under a permit issued by the State Government or the Commissioner for Food and Civil Supplies. If any person wants to carry rice by rail or motor from one place to another in the United Provinces, he can do so after obtaining a permit. There is nothing to show that there are difficulties or obstacles in the way of obtaining permits. I am, therefore, of the opinion that even if the provision restricts the right guaranteed by Article 19, the restriction is reasonable and therefore the provision is not unconstitutional.