STATE OF U P Vs. MATLOOB

JUDGEMENT

(1.) We have heard Sri AX Srivastava, learned A.G.A. on the merits of the present government appeal and Sarva Sri Sunil Kumar and Sri Sunil Vashisth learned Counsel appearing for respondents. We have perused the lower Court records. There is no dispute in it that after the case was committed, it was transferred to Fast Track Court No. 2, Ghaziabad by the learned Sessions Judge for trial. Thus, the Presiding Officer of Fast Track Court received the records of Sessions Trial No. 745 of 2001 and framed the charges on the first day of appearance of the accused persons, i.e., on 30.7.2001. It appears from the perusal of different orders passed by the Trial Court that neither summons nor warrant of arrest was issued for procuring the presence of witnesses by the Trial Court and by another order of transfer dated 211.2001, the case was made over to Fast Track Court No. 3, Ghaziabad and again we do not find any mention in the order sheet that any process had ever been issued by the Court or directed to be issued by any authority for ensuring the attendance of witnesses except as appears from order passed on 5.2.2002 on which date 27.2.2002 was fixed for evidence on which date no witness was in attendance, as a result of which the next date was 14.3.2002 and on that date, the learned Trial Judge passed the order that in view of the non production and non attendance of the witnesses for the prosecution in spite of warrant of arrest against the witnesses having been handed over to the prosecution party (order does not specify the name either of the person or the authority), no witness had been produced and that the learned Presiding Judge was satisfied that the prosecution was either not interested in procuring the attendance of the witnesses or the witnesses themselves were not interested in coming to support the charge. The Trial Court shut down the evidence of prosecution and passed a one-line order acquitting the respondents for the charges under section 307 and 452 IPC.

(2.) Speedy trial is one of the fundamental rights of the accused, but that right which was initially recognized in several cases including COMMON CAUSE, A REGISTERED SOCIETY v. UNION OF INDIA, 1996 4 SCC 33 . was subsequently reconsidered in Common Cause-II.,1996 4 SCC 775 Both the cases and other cases, like, that of Raj Deo Sharma v. State of Bihar, 1999 39 AllCriC 665 . were reviewed in P. Ramchandra Rao v. State of Karnataka, 2002 44 AllCriC 974 . by the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court and the ultimate directions of the Court were laid down in paragraph 29 of the said judgment, which are reproduced as under:-

(3.) What we may find from the above judgment in P. Ramchandra Rao is that the criminal Courts were not obliged to terminate the trial or criminal proceedings merely on account of lapse of time as prescribed by Common Cause -I and II and further, the criminal Courts were required to exercise their own powers, such as, those under sections 309, 311 and 258 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to effectuate the right of speedy trial. It was observed that a watchful and a diligent Trial Judge can prove to be a better protector of such right than any guidelines.