LAWS(ALL)-2013-8-37

AVADHA RAJ SINGH Vs. A.D.J., GORAKHPUR

Decided On August 12, 2013
Avadha Raj Singh Appellant
V/S
A.D.J., Gorakhpur Respondents

JUDGEMENT

(1.) HEARD Sri R.K. Saxena, learned counsel for tenant petitioner and Sri Vishnu Pratap, learned counsel for landlord respondent No.3/1. This writ petition was dismissed in default on 17.01.2001. Thereafter, it was restored. It was again dismissed in default on 16.04.2004 and again restored. It was again dismissed in default on 01.07.2008. Again restoration application was filed which was dismissed in default. Thereafter, another restoration application was filed. All the restoration applications were allowed on 31.05.2013 and on that date arguments of learned counsel for both the parties on the merit of the writ petition were also heard. This is tenant's writ petition arising out of eviction/ release proceedings on the ground of bona fide need under Section 21 of U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (U.P. Act No.13 of 1972) hereinafter referred to as U.P. Rent Control Act initiated by Ram Lakhan Jaiswal, original respondent No.3 since deceased and survived by legal representatives against petitioner and proforma respondents No.4 to 8 in the form of P.A. Case No.68 of 1982. Prescribed Authority, Gorakhpur allowed the release application on 06.02.1984 and directed eviction of the tenant. Against the said order, petitioner filed Misc. (Rent) Appeal No.101 of 1984. First A.D.J., Gorakhpur dismissed the appeal on 18.09.1986, hence this writ petition. Original Respondent No.3, Ram Lakhan, who filed the release application was owner of the property in dispute. He created a trust of the property in dispute through deed dated 11.06.1982. Sri Ram Lakhan died in 1987 during pendency of the writ petition. The trust deed is Annexure-1 to the counter affidavit.

(2.) THE first point argued before the courts below and repeated before this court was that through deed dated 11.06.1982, trust was to come into existence after the death of the executant of the deed as it was in the nature of Will. The courts below did not accept this argument. I am also unable to accept this argument. In the deed dated 11.06.1982, it was mentioned that the executant had no issue, his wife had died about three months before, hence he wanted to make such arrangement of his property which could be in the nature of religious and charitable purpose. It was specifically stated that the executant intended to construct hospital, school and dharmshala over his property for serving the humanity, and that it was also the last desire of his deceased wife. He appointed certain person to be the trustees after his death. He described the deed as will (ichhapatra). He further mentioned that whatever further property would be acquired by him until his death would also be reserved for he same purpose. Thereafter, it was mentioned in the present tense that whatever property he has or he acquires subsequently is being given to the trust and is being transferred (to trust). The only restriction was that until his death the executant was to manage the trust and after his death, the trustees.

(3.) PROPERTY in dispute is House No.607, Dilezakpur, Gorakhpur having six rooms, total area is 200 square yard and rent is Rs.25/- per month. The deed dated 11.06.1982 is a registered deed. It was stated in the release application that the building in dispute was in a dilapidated condition and after demolition new construction would be made and an application for getting the map passed had also been filed. Even though clause (b) was also mentioned in the release application but in fact it was under Clause (a) to Section 21(1) of the Act. Clause (a) states that "the building is bona fide required either in its existing form or after demolition and new construction by the landlord." It is wrong to say that an application under both the clauses (a) and (b) of Section 21(1) is maintainable. Under clause (b) bona fide need has got no relevance. The release application was filed by the landlord respondent No.3 under Clause (a) alone. Accordingly, there is absolutely no error in the finding of bona fide need recorded by both the courts below in favour of landlord respondent.