M P SRIVASTAVA Vs. S C SINHA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS second appeal, in which the present application has been moved, was dismissed by me on 27-8-1992. On 1st of September 1992, the present application under Order 41 Rule 2 read with section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure has been filed praying therein: "It is, therefore, most respectfully prayed that the Honourable Court be pleased to grant atleast 3 months time to file the Special Leave to Appeal before the Honourable Supreme Court and obtained the stay order and justice be done" The prayer as made in the application is patently misconceived. The time for filing the Special Leave to Appeal to the Honourable Supreme Court is provided under Article 133 of the Limitation Act The applicant's case is covered by sub-clause (c) of Article 133 Limitation Act which provides 90 days' time from the date of the judgment or order against the Special Leave to Appeal is sought to be filed As such there is no question of granting any time for filing Special Leave to Appeal in the Honourable Supreme Court. In the application there is no prayer for keeping in abeyance the decree passed by the High Court for the period the petitioner files Special Leave to Appeal in the Honourable Supreme Court,

(2.) HOWEVER, Sri Sankatha Rai. learned Advocate appearing for the applicant, argued that the High Court's decree and judgment passed in Second Appeal No. 1402 of 1989, decided on 27-8-1992 be kept in abeyance till the applicant files the Special Leave to Appeal in the Honourable Supreme Court. There is no such prayer in the application, neither anything Is stated in the affidavit filed in support of the application The application of the applicant can be rejected on this short ground.

(3.) SRI S. D. N. Singh, the counsel for the respondent-opposite party opposed the said request and contended that this Court has no jurisdiction to stay the execution of the decree finally passed by it as there is no provision under the Code of Civil Procedure under which such a stay can be granted. He also contended that firstly section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure is not attracted in the case and secondly it is not a fit case where this Court should exercise its inherent jurisdiction under section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure.